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Ever since its constitution the ILO has developed and maintained a system of labour 
standards in order to create decent work all over the world. With the globalisation 
of the economy multinationals have gained an important position in furthering these 
labour standards throughout their value chains. From a regulatory point of view this 
development has resulted in a panoply of law and law-like initiatives within the global 
space in order to implement the labour standards. Much is already known about these 
initiatives from an individual and isolated perspective. Yet, little is known about their 
interactions in the global space. Whereas the concept of global space acknowledges the 
coexistence of different regulatory forms serving different roles, the concept of hybrid 
structures acknowledges the fact that these regulations interact in several configura-
tions. The aim of this contribution is to map the main regulatory initiatives, to analyse 
their different roles in the global space of labour standards and to analyse in which 
configurations they interact. The findings of this analysis provide a more advanced and 
comprehensive understanding of the regulation of labour standards on the global level.
 
I. INTRODUCTION
On the international level the International Labour Organization (ILO) is the main or-
ganisation for the regulation of labour issues. Ever since its constitution the ILO has 
developed and maintained a system of labour standards to promote ‘opportunities for 
women and men to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, 
equity, security and dignity’.1 Part of this system is the definition and promotion of 
four core labour standards: 1) freedom of association and the effective recognition of 
the right to collective bargaining; 2) the elimination of all forms of forced or com-
pulsory labour; 3) the effective abolition of child labour; and 4) the elimination of 
* The author thanks the participants of the panel session at the ILERA Conference held in Amster-
dam in June 2013, in particular Isabelle Schömann and Stefano Giubboni, and the participants of 
the workshop on European and Transnational Rulemaking held in Amsterdam in July 2013, in 
particular Jonathan Zeitlin, for their helpful comments. The contribution has also benefited from 
highly appreciated discussions and suggestions on the (wider) subject of transnational regulation 
of CSRs in general with Maarten Keune, Teun Jaspers, Edoardo Ales, Saskia Klosse, Nicola Gundt, 
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discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.2 Since these rights are quali-
fied as ‘core’ standards, the ILO puts much emphasis on the promotion of these rights. 
It does so, firstly by identifying the Conventions and Recommendations addressing 
these topics as fundamental, and as such giving them a higher priority than the other
Conventions,3 and secondly by the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at work (hereafter the 1998 Declaration), which is also addressed to the Mem-
ber States. However, since it is a declaration, it is not dependent on whether or not it 
is ratified by those states.4 Thirdly, the ILO promotes these rights in its Tripartite Dec-
laration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (hereafter 
the Tripartite Declaration), which lays down guidelines for multinational enterprises, 
governments, and employers’ and workers’ organisations in such areas as employ-
ment, training, conditions of work and life, and industrial relations.5 There are also 
other international organisations that promote the implementation of these core labour 
standards (CLSs). The two organisations that are most active in this are the United Na-
tions Global Compact (UN GC)6 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)7. The UN GC is ‘a strategic policy initiative for businesses that 
are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted 
principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption’.8 In 
the area of labour, four principles have been identified, which are the four CLSs of 
the ILO. The OECD promotes the implementation of the ILO’s CLSs by its Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, which are ‘far-reaching recommendations addressed by 
governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries’ 
and as such, they ‘provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible business 
conduct in areas such as employment and industrial relations’.9 Besides these public 
international organisations, there are also non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that 
further the promotion of the ILO CSLs, for instance the Fair Labor Association; the Ethi-
cal Trading Initiative; Social Accountability International (or SA8000); the Fair Wear 
Foundation, etc.10 The main addressees of these NGOs are Multinational Enterprises or 
MNEs (and their full global chain). However, in the implementation and monitoring 
2 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998. 
3 These Conventions are: Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise (1948); Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (1949); 
Convention 29 on Forced Labour (1930); Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour 
(1957); Convention 138 on Minimum Age (1973); Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour (1999); Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration (1951); and Convention 111 on 
Discrimination in Employment and Occupation (1958).
4 For a discussion about what this might mean for the status of fundamental social rights as fun-
damental human rights, see P. Alston, ‘“Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the 
International Labour Rights Regime’, (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 3, 457-521; B. 
A. Langille, ‘Core Labour Rights – The True Story (Reply to Alston)’, (2005) 16 European Journal 
of International Law 3, 409-437; F. Maupain, ‘Revitalization not Retreat. The Real Potential of the 
1998 ILO Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights’, (2005) 16 European Journal 
of International Rights 3, 439-465; and P. Alston, ‘Facing Up the Complexities of the ILO’s Core 
Labour Standards Agenda’, (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 3, 467-480.
5 Introduction to the Tripartite Declaration, available at http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/ 
WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm.
6 UN Global Compact, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinci-
ples/index.html. 
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of compliance other actors are involved as well, often including workers’ representa-
tives. Lastly, on the global level, ILO CLSs are also promoted by MNEs themselves. 
This is either done by unilaterally adopted codes of conduct that are part of the MNEs’ 
corporate social responsibility strategies (CSRs) or via bilateral international framework 
agreements that have been concluded between the management of an MNE on the one 
side and workers’ organisations on the other side, among which Global Union Federa-
tions, World Works Councils and European Works Councils11.12 
Research on each of these regulatory forms is extensive and thorough and provides 
interesting insights.13 Nevertheless, hardly any of this research discusses these forms 
in relation to each other.14 This is quite remarkable when considering this in the 
 pageId=1458; http://www.fairwear.org/488/labour-standards/1.-employment-is-freely-cho-
sen/. This is just a small selection from many others.  
11 About this, see in general: I. Schömann, A. Sobczak, E. voss & P. Wilke, Codes of conduct and in-
ternational framework agreements: New forms of governance at company level (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Luxembourg, 2008).
12 There are more regulatory forms on the global level, for instance social clauses in trade agree-
ments and labour standards in subcontracting, however, these are not part of the mainstream 
literature on the promotion and implementation of the ILO CLS. Since this contribution aims 
to connect with the mainstream literature, these forms are excluded. See on these forms: M.-A. 
Moreau, Normes sociale, droit du travail et mondialisation (Dalloz, Paris, 2006), 190-208; and G. Wil-
liams, S. Davies & C. Chinguno, ‘Subcontracting and Labour Standards: Reassessing the Potential 
of International Framework Agreements’, (2013) British Journal of Industrial Relations, early online 
publication of 5.03.2013.
13 Just a selection from many: on the ILO Conventions: J.-M. Servais, International Employment and 
Labour Law (ILO, Geneva, 2011); and L. Betten, International Labour Law – Selected Issues (Kluwer, 
Deventer, 1993). See on the initiatives of other international organisations: Y. Kryvoi, ‘Enforcing 
Labor Rights against Multinational Corporate Groups in Europe’, (2007) 46 Industrial Relations 2; 
P.P. Miretski & S.-D. Bachmann, ‘The UN “Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”: A Requiem’, (2012) 
17 Deakin Law Review 1, 5-41; and J. G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights 
(Norton, London, 2013). See on the initiatives of non-governmental organisations: I. Dauga-
reilh, ‘La norme ISO 26000 sur la responsabilité sociétale des organisations: observations sur 
une expérience d’inter-normativité’, in M. Capron, F. Quairel-Lanoizelée & M. F. Turcotte (eds), 
ISO 26000: une Norme ‘hors norme? (Economica, Paris, 2010), 147-163; S. Barrientos & S. Smith, 
‘Do workers benefit from ethical trade? Assessing codes of labour practice in global produc-
tion systems’, (2007) 28 Third World Quarterly 4, 713-729; and F. Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of 
Transnational Private Regulation’, (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 1, 20-49. On CSR Codes of 
Conduct, see R. Jenkins, R. Pearson & G. Seyfan (eds), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights. Codes 
of Conduct in the Global Economy (Earthscan, London, 2002); and F. J. L. Pennings, Y. Konijn & A. 
G. veldman, Social responsibility in labour relations – European and Comparative perspectives (Kluwer Law In-
ternational, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2008). See on IFAs: K. Papadakis (ed), Cross-border Social Dialogue 
and Agreements: An emerging global industrial relations framework? (ILO, Geneva, 2008); and N. Hammer, 
‘International Framework Agreements: global industrial relations between rights and bargaining’, 
(2005) 11 Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 4, 511-530.
14 There are some scholars that do address more than one initiative, however mostly descriptive 
as also existent, without making a connection between the initiatives, eg M.-A. Moreau, Normes 
sociales, droit du travail et mondialisation. Confrontations et mutations (Dalloz, Paris, 2006); R. Jenkins, R. 
Pearson & G. Seyfan (eds), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights. Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy 
(Earthscan, London, 2002); B. Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Hart Publishers, London, 
2005); and B. Bercusson & C. Estlund (eds), Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalization: New Chal-
lenges, New Institutions (Hart Publishing, London, 2008). Also, some of them are limited in their 
scope of initiatives, since they only address public initiatives or private initiatives. An example 
of the former is L. Betten, International Labour Law. Selected Issues (Kluwer, Deventer, 1993), who not 
only deals with the Conventions of the ILO, but also with initiatives of regional organisations, 
like the European Union. An example of the latter is a 2008 Eurofound report: I. Schömann, A. 
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context of the doctrine on hybrid structures between hard law and soft law,15 and 
more broadly in the arena of transnational governance that is also referred to as ‘global 
space’,16 or more specifically in the context of labour law, as ‘hybrid global labour 
law’.17 Basic to both doctrines is the recognition that traditional forms of regulation 
by law coexist with other forms of regulation that are law-like, yet different in (legal) 
nature and regulatory dynamics. With traditional forms of regulation is understood the 
law of public organisations that stress enforcement and compliance with fixed norms.18 
Law-like forms of regulation are understood to mean regulatory initiatives of (multi-
stakeholder) private organisations, including NGOs, MNEs and trade unions, that put 
emphasis on collective problem-solving in complex situations with rather open-ended 
standards.19 In general these two regulatory forms are associated with two roles in 
global space: rule orientation and problem-solving, respectively.20 Furthermore, these 
two broad forms of regulation do not just coexist. On the contrary, they serve dif-
ferent roles in the ‘global space’ and interact in a wide variety of configurations.21 
The type of configuration between the regulatory forms determines how the roles fit 
together, ie whether they downplay each other or play to each other’s strengths. The 
doctrine on hybrid structures distinguishes three main configurations: rivalry – when 
the different initiatives fight for dominance; complementarity – when the different 
initiatives coexist peacefully, either by unplanned design or by well-elaborated design; 
transformativity – when the different initiatives merge and each constituent part is 
needed to achieve the goal.22 What these doctrines together implicate is that in order 
to grasp the full extent of what is happening on the global space a wider approach 
needs to be taken to law, focusing on all regulatory (law-like) forms and their distin-
guished roles. Furthermore, these regulatory forms need to be studied in relation to 
each other, since their configuration determines to what extent these regulatory forms 
Sobczak, E. voss & P. Wilke, Codes of conduct and international framework agreements: New forms of governance 
at company level (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
Luxembourg, 2008).
15 A doctrine that has been introduced in the debate on ‘new governance’ and is most elaborately 
developed by D. M. Trubek & L. G. Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Comple-
mentarity, Rivalry or Transformation’, (2007) 13 Columbian Journal of European Law 3, 539 – 564.
16 About this, see M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, 
Experimentation, and Deliberation in Global Space’, (2012) 21 Transnational Law & Contemporary 
Problems, 359-393.
17 U. Mückenberger, ‘Hybrid Global Labour Law’, in R. Blanpain & F. Hendrickx (eds), Labour Law 
between Change and Tradition – Liber Amicorum Antoine Jacobs (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
2011), 99-116.
18 M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, 
and Deliberation in Global Space’, op cit, 359, note 15.
19 Ibid. About this in the context of ‘new governance’ see also: G. De Búrca & J. Scott, ‘Introduc-
tion’, in G. De Búrca & J. Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 
Portland, 2006), 6. 
20 M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, 
and Deliberation in Global Space’, op cit, 361, note 15, where they draw on the work of trade 
law scholar Robert E. Hudec.
21 M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, 
and Deliberation in Global Space’, op cit, note 15; and D. M. Trubek and L. G. Trubek, ‘New 
Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry or Transformation’, op cit, note 14.
22 D. M. Trubek and L. G. Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Ri-
valry or Transformation’, op cit, note 14.
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are able to play their distinguished roles.23 Moreover, together these doctrines imply 
that a subject is best regulated when the several regulatory forms employ both roles 
(rule-setting and problem-solving) and when this is done in a hybrid configuration 
where they consciously interact, either in a transformative configuration (love) or in 
a complementary configuration (flirt), whereas this could become futile when they 
interact as rivals (repel). 
The aim of this contribution is to gain a better understanding of the hybrid global 
space by which the core labour standards of the ILO are promoted, in particular in 
the cross-border situation of labour, ie the activities of MNEs. Therefore, section two 
starts with more elaborate descriptions of the doctrine on global space, in particular 
with regard to the two roles and the governance mechanisms that are associated with 
those roles, and the doctrine on hybrid structures. When these two doctrines are taken 
together, it gives an impression of how the hybrid global space is shaped. The initia-
tives identified in this introduction will be analysed against the background of these 
two doctrines, thus for their role in the global space and the governance mechanism 
deployed by the respective initiatives and their possible configurations in this global 
space. This is firstly done for the public initiatives (section 3) and secondly for the pri-
vate initiatives (section 4). In section 5, the findings of those two sections are brought 
together in order to sketch the hybrid global space that governs the promotion of the 
implementation of the ILO CLSs by MNEs.
II. THE DOCTRINE ON GLOBAL SPACE AND THE DOCTRINE ON HYBRID 
STRUCTURES
In the introduction it is outlined that the ILO CLSs are, on the global level, not only 
promoted by the Conventions of the ILO itself, but by a panoply of regulatory forms, 
varying from traditional laws to law-like instruments. On a very nuanced and detailed 
level, the variety of regulatory forms is probably infinite. Therefore, the identification 
of regulatory forms in this contribution is confined to the most prominent forms. 
These are: the ILO Conventions; law-like instruments of public organisations (the 1998 
Declaration; the Tripartite Declaration; the guidelines of the OECD and the UN Global 
Compact programme); law-like initiatives of non-governmental organisations (eg the Fair 
Labor Association; the Fair Wear Foundation; the Ethical Trade Initiative; ISO 26000 and 
SA8000); and the self-regulatory initiatives of MNEs – unilateral initiatives (CSR codes 
of conduct) and bi/multilateral initiatives (international framework agreements (IFAs)). 
Together these regulatory initiatives comprise what is referred to as the ‘global space’. In 
order to grasp the full extent of these regulatory initiatives with respect to the ILO CLSs, 
it is necessary to identify first their distinguished regulatory roles and governance mecha-
nisms and, secondly, since they coexist in the same space, their configurations. The 
doctrine on global space offers insights to identify the role and governance mechanisms, 
while the doctrine on hybrid structures maps three basic configurations. Both doctrines 
together give an impression of the regulatory ‘hybrid global space’ of the ILO CLSs.
A. Doctrine on global space
Cottrell and Trubek use the term ‘global space’ to refer to ‘an evolving regulatory 
environment created by both globalization and the increasing role international norms
23 For a similar conclusion in the context of transnational private regulation, see F. Cafaggi, ‘New 
Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’, op cit, note 11.
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play in domestic settings’.24 Based on a literature review, they come to at least four 
defining features of this space: first, global space is increasingly diverse and complex 
since law has to bring some degree of uniformity between a great variation of social 
systems and legal orders; secondly, the regulatory arena is plural in terms of legal 
orders (horizontal and vertical) and in terms of participating actors (public and pri-
vate); thirdly, it is recognised that international systems of coercion are relatively weak 
and limited in means; and fourthly, a knowledge deficit that is the result of a high 
degree of uncertainty concerning the optimal solutions to problems.25 These features 
have resulted in the development of the global space, comprising two main roles: the 
conventional rule-setting role of international law that stresses the enforcement and 
compliance with fixed rules, and a problem-solving role that emphasises the opera-
tion of multi-level networks, the role of experimentation and deliberation in order to 
internalise open-ended standards.26
What these two distinctive roles (rule-setting and problem-solving) characterises is 
drawn from the literature on legalisation27 and new governance.28 The concept of le-
galisation reflects traditional, legalist ideas on international public law: law as a system 
of precise rules that are adopted according to a procedure and that are interpreted and 
enforced by third-party decision makers.29 Furthermore, it makes the implicit assump-
tion that greater degrees of lawfulness, substance, and structure30 ‘will lead to more 
compliance and hence greater cooperative gains’.31 Although this may not always be 
the case,32 it represents the core governance mechanisms of the first role – rule-setting 
– of law-like processes that comprise the global space.
The second role of law-like processes that comprise the global space – problem-
solving – involves ‘a common understanding that a problem exists, consensus that it 
ought to be solved, and the mobilization of appropriate expertise and resources to do 
so’.33 In order to achieve this, some governance mechanisms must be created. Firstly, 
24 M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, 
and Deliberation in Global Space’, op cit, 362, note 15.
25 Ibid, 362-363.
26 Ibid, 362. In his search of hybrid global labour law, Mückenberger comes to a more or less simi-
lar conclusion when he says: ‘Public legal regulations are either non-existent in the global sphere 
or their enforcement power is more or less totally missing. […] Any expectation for a global 
labour law can therefore not rely on that public angle. As against that, private ordering exist on 
a global level and its power seems substantial’, U. Mückenberger, ‘Hybrid Global Labour Law’, 
op cit, 109, note 16. 
27 K. W. Abbott, R. O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A.-M. Slaughter & D. Snidal, ‘The concept of legali-
zation’, (2000) 54 International Organization 3, 401-419. See for a further developed concept: B. P. 
ter Haar, ‘Open Method of Coordination. An analysis of its meaning for the development of a 
social Europe’, Dissertation University of Leiden, MI 271, 53-57.
28 D. M. Trubek & L. G. Trubek, ‘Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role 
of the Open Method of Coordination’, (2005) 11 European Law Journal 3, 343-364; and more gen-
erally G. de Búrca & J. Scott (eds), Law and Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2006).
29 M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, 
and Deliberation in Global Space’, op cit, 364, note 15; K. W. Abbott et al, ‘The concept of legali-
zation’, op cit, note 26.
30 B. P. ter Haar, ‘Open Method of Coordination. An analysis of its meaning for the development 
of a social Europe’, op cit, 54, note 26. 
31 M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, 
and Deliberation in Global Space’, op cit, 364, note 15; and M. Kahler, ‘The Causes and Conse-
quences of Legalization’, (2000) 54 International Organization 3, 661-683.
32 M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, 
and Deliberation in Global Space’, op cit, 365, note 15.
33 Ibid, 367.
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mechanisms are to be deployed that ‘seek to promote experimentation and knowledge 
dissemination’.34 Secondly, these mechanisms must create participation, not only be-
cause stakeholders have the knowledge (and resources) to solve the problems, but also 
because their involvement generates procedural and substantive legitimacy. Thirdly, 
they should have the ability to translate knowledge into norms.35 Related to these three 
governance mechanisms, Cottrell and Trubek identify five features characterising the 
role of problem-solving. The first feature is ‘the emphasis on broad and open-ended 
standards whose full meaning and impact must be worked out through multi-level, de-
liberative and probably consensual means’.36 The second feature is that of experimenta-
tion. Because of the complexities and uncertainties, the governance mechanism creates 
an iterative process that promotes the exchange of best practices and renders standards 
revisable.37 The latter – revisable standards – implies the third feature, namely that 
the law-like process needs to accommodate deliberation and negotiation. The fourth 
characteristic feature is that there is not one source of law (lawmaker), hence there 
are multiple actors that cooperate and coordinate their actions vertically and horizon-
tally in a multi-level governance setting, involving public officials, private actors and 
epistemic communities.38 The fifth characteristic Cottrell and Trubek have identified of 
this expanded vision of the law of global space is the fact that both roles – rule-setting 
and problem-solving – are often yoked together in hybrid constellations.39 What these 
constellations can be, will be further described in the next section on the doctrine of 
hybrid structures.
B. Doctrine on hybrid structures
While the concept of global space recognises that ‘all legal sources in the world have 
their particular means and procedures of implementation and enforcement’, the theory 
of hybrid structures takes this one step further and argues that sources that operate at 
the same time and contribute to a common goal, act ‘in a multi-fold interplay of public 
and private actors in the processes of norm-building and norm-implementing’.40 With 
this it is recognised that a significant development has taken place. The doctrine of 
hybrid structures aims to help understand this process. Therefore it maps several basic 
configurations between law and law-like processes; between traditional command and 
control processes and forms of new governance; and between hard law and soft law. 




37 Ibid, 368-369. See also J. Zeitlin, ‘Pragmatic Transnationalism: Governance Across Borders in the 
Global Economy’, (2011) 9 Socio-Economic Review, 187-206.
38 Ibid, 369. See also D. Drezner, All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey, 2009). See in general about multi-level governance: D. Messner, 
‘The Concept of the “World Economic Triangle”: Global Governance Patterns and Options for 
Regions’, IDS Working Paper 173, 2002; G. Marks & L. Hooghe, ‘Contrasting visions of multi-
level governance’, in I. Bache & M. Flinders (eds), Multi-Level Governance (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004), 15-30; and with respect to transnational industrial relations: M. Keune & P. 
Margison, ‘Transnational Industrial Relations as Multi-Level Governance: Interdependencies in 
European Social Dialogue’, (2012) British Journal of Industrial Relations.
39 M. P. Cottrell & D. M. Trubek, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, 
and Deliberation in Global Space’, op cit, 371, note 15.
40 U. Mückenberger, ‘Hybrid Global Labour Law’, op cit, 113, note 16. 
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‘When each [system] is operating at the same time and contributing to a common 
objective but they have not merged, we describe them as complementary. When the 
newer forms of governance are designed to perform the same tasks as legal regu-
lation and are thought to do it better, or otherwise there seems to be a necessary 
choice between systems, we speak of rivalry between the co-existing processes.’41
 
The third variety, transformation, is used to 
‘describe configurations in which governance and traditional law are not only com-
plementary; they are integrated into a single system and the functioning of each 
element is necessary for the successful operation of the other’.42
Whereas complementarity speaks for itself, the other two varieties need further expla-
nation. The variety rivalry knows three configurations. The first configuration of rivalry 
is when traditional regulation and governance are alternative routes of equal value. 
They show no interaction with each other since the choice is either the one or the 
other. The potential threat lies in the fact that one of the processes can become more 
popular than the other and consequently suppress the other.43 When this occurs con-
sciously this form of rivalry formed by the implication that one form of regulation, in 
particular governance, is superior over the other and is therefore preferred.44 Thirdly, 
rivalry can exist when the traditional form of regulation creates unacceptable standards 
that can be avoided by a governance process. Particularly this refers to the situation 
in which traditional law is unable to frame workable solutions as a result of which 
stakeholders are forced to seek ways out of the regulatory vice.45 
The variety transformation is divided into three sub-varieties as well. In the first variety, 
law creates new governance procedures and mandates basic parameters. This is also 
indicated as a shift to ‘proceduralism’ in legal regulation: law structures procedures for 
problem-solving while the norms are entrenched in the reflexive practice of govern-
ance.46 The second variety of transformation is formed when ‘new governance solves 
the problems and law provides a safety net’.47 Law, for instance, might create minimal 
standards while governance is available for those who exceed the standards. This va-
riety is also indicated as default hybridity.48 The law thus allows stakeholders ‘to “opt 
out” of the legal regime on condition that they use new governance processes such as 
self-regulation and self-monitoring to exceed minimum standards’.49 Thirdly, transfor-
41 D. M. Trubek & L. G. Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry 




45 Ibid, 12. See also: C. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Ex-
perimentalist Governance in the European Union’, Paper prepared for presentation at the ARENA 
seminar, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, 2006, available at http://www2.law.
columbia.edu/sabel/papers/EU%20governance%20paper%20060406.pdf.
46 Ibid, 12-13. Where they draw on the work of Gunter Teubner: G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and 
Reflexive elements in Modern Law’, (1983) 17 Law & Society Review, 286; and G. Teubner, ‘The 
King’s Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy’, (1997) 31 Law & Society Review, 
788. They derive this variety also from the case study of J. Scott & J. Holder, ‘Law and New 
Environmental Governance in the European Union’, in G. De Búrca & J. Scott (eds), Law and New 
Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006), 211-242. 
47 Ibid, 13.
48 G. De Búrca & J. Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US, op cit, 9.
49 D. M. Trubek & L. G. Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry 
or Transformation’, op cit, 550, note 15.
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mation comes in the variety where traditional regulation (hard law) provides general 
norms while governance is used to make them more concrete.50 
Furthermore, Trubek and Trubek note that hybrid structures can be designed con-
sciously in order to get the best of all regulatory forms involved. Hybrid structures can 
also gradually grow into a complementary structure or merge in a new constellation. 
Sometimes this is done intentionally to displace older forms of regulation; however, 
it can also occur unintentionally because the newer form makes it hard to deploy 
traditional modes that then wither away. In such a constellation the newer and older 
forms coexist as rivals.51
These configurations seem simple; yet, the identification thereof is not, in particular 
when more than two regulatory forms are involved. Moreover, for a full analysis of 
the configurations, in-depth qualitative research is needed, including empirical re-
search, such as interviews.52 In this paper the analysis is limited to what is found in 
the regulatory initiatives. More specifically, the analysis is conducted as follows. One 
of the aims of the paper is to map the hybrid global structure of regulatory forms that 
coexist in the field of the core labour standards of the ILO. Therefore, configurations 
are sought with the ILO as the primary organisation to regulate labour rights on the 
global level. In this context, three initiatives of the ILO are of interest: the eight Con-
ventions dealing with the core labour rights; the 1998 Declaration; and the Tripartite 
Declaration. To establish what kind of configuration is made with one or more of 
these initiatives, several aspects of the other initiatives have been analysed. First, they 
have been analysed with regard to their content, ie which CLS they address. Secondly, 
it has been analysed whether the initiatives provide for their own definition of those 
CLSs, or whether they refer to another initiative. Thirdly, when the latter is the case, 
it is further analysed which initiative reference is made to. It is likely that this will be 
one of the initiatives of the ILO. Nevertheless, it is imaginable that reference is made 
to, for instance, the standards of the OECD, the UN Global Compact or NGOs, which 
in turn might refer to an initiative of the ILO. Consequently, the hybrid configuration 
can exist of several shackles. 
The aim of this approach is to determine whether the regulatory forms of global CLSs 
recognise the ILO as a principal initiative or not, and if not, whether or not an indirect 
configuration is formed which will most likely be via another initiative. When the 
analysed initiative makes no reference to another regulatory form and uses its own 
definitions, it is considered a rival to the ILO initiatives. When the analysed initiative 
recognises the ILO, directly or indirectly, the text is analysed examining whether the 
recognition is limited to only a reference to the ILO, or that it is intended to create a 
stronger configuration. Signs of a stronger configuration are for instance found when 
the initiative refers to several initiatives of the ILO or to implementation mechanisms 
available at the ILO, for example the ILO Helpdesk for Business on International Labour 
Standards.53 To what extent this configuration is consciously constructed, is determined 
50 Ibid. See also F. Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’, op cit, 40-41, 
note 14.
51 Ibid.
52 Research on IFAs has for instance shown that not all regulatory mechanisms are included in the 
IFA itself. Therefore, an analysis based on only the texts of these initiatives is limited as it does 
not take into account the practice around the initiative. Cf C. Welz, ‘A Qualitative Analysis of In-
ternational Framework Agreements: Implementation and Impact’, and D. Stevis, ‘The Impacts of 
International Framework Agreements: Lessons from the Daimler case’, both in K. Papadakis (ed), 
Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact of International Framework Agreements (ILO/Palgrave, Geneva, 
2011), 38-60 and 116-142, respectively.
53 http://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/business-helpdesk/lang--en/index.htm.
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based on the reasons for the adoption of the initiative for as far as these are traceable. 
When these cannot be traced for the particular initiative or when the analysis is of 
a more general nature (which will be the case for CSR Codes of Conduct and IFAs), 
secondary sources will be used, mainly literature about these initiatives.
C. Other methodological issues
Impressionistic analysis
For a good and comprehensive understanding of the hybrid global space of the ILO 
CLSs in-depth analyses are needed. Such exceeds the possibility of this single article and 
is to be left for further research in a bigger research project.54 Instead, the aim of this 
contribution is to give a first impression of the hybrid global space by an impression-
istic analysis of the core regulatory initiatives. It intends to give an impression of the 
type of roles (rule-setting or problem-solving) the different initiatives serve and how 
they interact with respect to the implementation of the fundamental social rights that 
form the ILO’s core labour standards. This impressionistic analysis has several conse-
quences, three of which are to be particularly noted. Firstly the number of regulatory 
initiatives is limited to the main initiatives and where necessary to a selection (which is 
the case for NGOs and CSR codes of conduct). Secondly, the analysis itself is limited to 
these initiatives, whereas sometimes many more initiatives/programmes are involved. 
If this is the case, such is indicated in a footnote. Thirdly, for a full analysis it would 
be necessary to separately analyse the fundamental rights involved, since it is known 
that some of them are more often addressed than others, which is in particular so for 
forced labour and child labour. 
A selection of initiatives
The initiatives of public international organisations are limited in number, which 
makes it possible to focus on the most dominant ones: ILO Conventions, the 1998 
Declaration, the Tripartite Declaration, the OECD Guidelines and the UN Global Com-
pact, including the Ruggie framework. These are different from the private initiatives, 
in particular those by non-governmental organisations and those that are part of an 
MNE’s CSR policy. Some estimates indicate over 7,000 initiatives.55 There is a good 
knowledge of the number of international framework agreements (IFAs), but this 
number is growing.56 In essence, for all these initiatives it is to be considered which 
ones are included in the analysis and which ones are not. This consideration differs 
per type of initiative.
The number of NGOs that deal with labour rights is unknown. However, when search-
ing the internet for this kind of NGOs, several things stand out, some of which are 
54 As such, this contribution is to be considered a pre-study for a bigger research project that is 
being developed by the author.
55 www.csrhub.com for instance rates over 7,000 CSR policies and strategies.
56 In 1988 the first IFA was signed, another 23 have been signed between 1988 and 2002, and 
in the following four years another 33. By mid-2010 there were about 80 IFAs in total. This is 
the number of IFAs involving a GUF; however, when a wider definition is taken, approximately 
160 initiatives exist. About this, see K. Papadakis, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in K. Papadakis 
(ed), Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact of International Framework Agreements (ILO/Palgrave, 
Geneva, 2011), 1-18 (in particular at 5).
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helpful to make a representative selection. Firstly, certain NGOs address human rights 
in general, which include (some) labour rights,57 whereas other NGOs address labour 
rights specifically.58 For the latter, a further distinction can be made between NGOs that 
aim to further the implementation of labour rights no matter what kind of business 
the company is active in,59 and NGOs that target a specific sector.60 Another selection 
criteria is distinguishing between NGOs that have a national focus and those that focus 
on MNEs and their supply chain. The interest of this paper lies with the latter, yet 
not with any of the other distinctions. Therefore a random sample is taken from each 
of these three categories.61 More specifically, the initiatives of Human Rights Watch, 
the Ethical Trading Initiative, SA8000, the Fair Labor Association and the Fair Wear 
Foundation will be analysed.
With respect to CSR codes of conduct, the number, exceeding 7,000, is by far too high 
for the qualitative document analysis that is aimed for in this paper. Instead the analysis 
relies on secondary sources (literature) and a sample of about twenty CSR policies that 
are rated the best at csrhub.com. To select this sample two criteria are used: sectoral62 
and geographical63 spread. These criteria are based on, firstly, comments that these kind 
of initiatives are a ‘hobby of the West’ and, secondly, empirical findings that in some 
sectors CSR policies are more developed than in others. 
Unlike the other two private initiatives, there is a good overview of the number of 
IFAs. Also, some quantitative data is available, including for instance an analysis of 
the substantive provisions of IFAs, in particular concerning references to ILO Conven-
tions64 and other regulatory forms, among which the 1998 Declaration, the Tripartite 
Declaration, the OECD Guidelines, the UN Global Compact, and SA8000.65 Secondly, 
there are some interesting case studies on implementation and compliance mechanisms 
57 About this, see, among others M. Winston, ‘NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility’, (2002) 16 Ethics and International Affairs 2, 71-87. Examples of general human rights 
organisations also dealing with fundamental social rights are: Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch.
58 Among many others: SA 8000 (http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.
viewPage&PageID=1458); ISO 26000 (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.




61 For another categorisation of NGOs, see R. Jenkins, ‘The political economy of codes of conduct’, 
in R. Jenkins, R. Pearson & G. Seyfan (eds), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights. Codes of Conduct in 
the Global Economy (Earthscan, London, 2002), 13-42 (at 14-15).
62 For the sectoral division, the divisions of the Global Union Federations are taken as a guidance. 
However, since there are currently eleven, this would scatter the sample too much. Hence, the 
five most active ones were selected: BWI; Industriall; UNI; IUF and PSI. These are active in the 
following sectors, respectively: building, building materials, wood, forestry and related areas of 
work; mining, energy and manufacturing sectors; skills and services; food, agriculture, hotel, 
restaurant, catering, and tobacco; and public services. More elaborately on GUFs, see http://
www.global-unions.org/about-us.html. 
63 Europe (including the Russian Federation); Africa; Asia/the Pacific; Latin America; and North 
America/Canada.
64 K. Papadakis (ed), Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact of International Framework Agreements (ILO/
Palgrave, Geneva, 2011), Appendix: Provisions in IFAs, Table 2 (249-256).
65 Ibid, Table 3 (257-258).
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applied in IFAs.66 Since this information enables a more balanced analysis, the analysis 
is limited to the 80 IFAs that are identified in these studies.67
III. GOvERNANCE MECHANISMS AND HYBRIDITY OF PUBLIC REGULATORY 
INITIATIvES
As indicated in the above section, there is a whole panoply of initiatives that aim to 
regulate and promote the ILO CLSs. The aim of this section is to analyse the main 
initiatives of public international organisations, including the ILO itself, the United 
Nations, in particular the Global Compact programme, and the OECD. Each subsection 
starts with a brief description of what the initiative aims at, and is followed by an 
analysis of the regulatory mechanism it therefore uses, in order to identify what role 
the initiative fulfils within the global space of the ILO CLSs: rule-setting or problem-
solving. Lastly, the initiatives are analysed with regard to their hybrid configuration, in 
particular with the initiatives of the ILO, as explained in section two above.
A. Regulatory initiatives by the ILO
The ILO itself applies an array of regulatory initiatives to further the implementation 
and application of the core labour standards. The cornerstones of these initiatives are 
the Conventions that have been labelled as fundamental or core Conventions. In gener-
al the core Conventions lay down the basic rights that need to be implemented by the 
ratifying countries. Most of the core Conventions are supplemented by a Recommenda-
tion which holds more detailed guidelines on how the rights of the Conventions are 
to be implemented.68 In essence the main principle of the ILO is simple: the norms of 
the ratified Conventions and supplementing Recommendations are to be implemented 
and complied with.69 To monitor this the ILO has developed a rather sophisticated 
supervisory system comprised of several complementary elements.70 As summarised by 
Swepston, the purpose of this monitoring system is 
‘not simply to find “violations” and order that they be corrected, though this ele-
ment does figure among the ILO’s possibilities. It is rather to discover through 
regular and sustained supervision where states have failed to implement standards 
fully, and to work together for their implementation. To this end, all ILO technical 
assistance is geared to the implementation of ILO standards, and all suggestions by 
its supervisory bodies for improvements in national situations are backed up by 
offers of assistance to help in doing so.’71
66 Eg C. Welz, ‘A Qualitative Analysis of International Framework Agreements: Implementation and 
Impact’, op cit; and D. Stevis, ‘The Impacts of International Framework Agreements: Lessons from 
the Daimler case’, op cit.
67 Which covers about 80 % of all currently signed IFAs, ie 104. For a list of all IFAs, see http://
www.global-unions.org/framework-agreements.html.
68 For instance Conventions 29 and 105, concerning forced labour and the abolition of forced 
labour, respectively, are complemented by Recommendation 36 concerning forced labour 
(regulation). For a comprehensive overview, see http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=1000:12030:0::NO:::.
69 L. Swepston, ‘Supervision of ILO Standards’, (1997) 13 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations 4, 327.
70 J.-M. Servais, International Employment and Labour Law, op cit, 291.
71 L. Swepston, ‘Supervision of ILO Standards’, op cit, 327.
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Although it goes beyond the scope of this article to describe this sophisticated system 
into more detail, it is clear from this indicative description that the supervisory mecha-
nisms that are backing up the Conventions are not limited to traditional command and 
control, although this is also part of it. Hence, they are complemented with problem-
solving mechanisms.72  
The second instrument of the ILO that deals with the CLSs is the 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The 1998 Declaration ‘is an expression of 
commitment by governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations to uphold basic 
human values – values that are vital to our social and economic lives’.73 Indeed, as 
argued by N’Diaye, the 1998 Declaration commits all the Member States by the mere 
fact of membership of the ILO.74 Conversely, the ILO has an obligation to assist its 
members in their established and expressed needs in order to attain the Declaration’s 
objectives. This assistance is in particular provided by advisory services and support, 
by setting up priorities and plans for technical cooperation, by mobilising internal 
and external resources and by encouraging other development partners to contribute 
to this process.75 How this is to be done is further elaborated in the Follow-up to the 
Declaration, which is designed as complementary to the established supervisory system 
on the ratified Conventions.76 It is comprised of two elements: the Annual Review 
by the ILO Declaration Expert-Advisors (IDEA); and the Global Reports by the ILO 
Director-General, in conjunction with technical cooperation identification and activities 
to create a momentum for economic and social development.77 The purpose of the an-
nual Global Reports is to provide ‘a worldwide dynamic picture that highlights trends 
and current development in the realization of one of three fundamental principles and 
rights at work’.78 Based on these reports priorities are identified and action plans for 
technical cooperation are drawn up.
The purpose of the Annual Review is ‘to provide a yearly opportunity to examine the 
efforts made in accordance with the Declaration by Members which have not yet rati-
fied all the fundamental Conventions’.79 Expert advisors assess the reports with regard 
to difficulties encountered by the reporting countries in achieving the principles and 
rights, and make comments and recommendations that are to be further discussed 
between the ILO Governing Body and the countries involved. This has allowed the ILO
72 For elaborate descriptions of the supervisory mechanisms of the ILO, see L. Swepston, ‘Supervi-
sion of ILO Standards’, op cit; J.-C. Javillier & B. Gernigon (eds), Les normes internationales du travail: 
un patrimoine pour l’avenir. Mélanges en l’honneur de Nicolas Valticos (ILO, Geneva, 2004), in particular the 
contributions in Part I: The Supervisory System. 
73 http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm.
74 M. N’Diaye, ‘The Annual Review and the promotion of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work: Developments and initial impact assessment’, in J.-C. Javillier 
& B. Gernigon, Les normes internationales du travail: un patrimoine pour l’avenir. Mélanges en l’honneur de Nicolas 
Valticos (ILO, Geneva, 2004), 411-462 (at 411). 
75 Art 3 of the 1998 Declaration.
76 Art I (2) of the Follow-up to the 1998 Declaration.
77 Art I (3) of the Follow-up to the 1998 Declaration, juncto Art 19 (5) (e) of the ILO Constitution. 
See also M. N’Diaye, ‘The Annual Review and the promotion of the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: Developments and initial impact assessment’, op cit, 
412-414, note 76.
78 M. N’Diaye, ‘The Annual Review and the promotion of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work: Developments and initial impact assessment’, op cit, 413, note 
76.
79 Art II.1 of the 1998 Declaration Follow-up.
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to give greater exposure to and raise awareness about the CLSs.80 Furthermore, by its 
iterative yearly cycle, it is argued that the ILO has been able to trigger national efforts 
to respect, promote and realise the principles and rights of the 1998 Declaration. This 
has in particular been done by: 
‘(i) legal recognition; (ii) policy and institutional reforms; (iii) legislative and 
regulatory changes; (iv) preventive, enforcement and sanctions mechanisms; (v) 
promotional/advocacy and capacity-building activities; (vi) special attention to 
particular situations or groups; and (vii) data collection and information. This 
impact is further enhanced by: (viii) a regular and constructive national, regional 
and international dialogue on FPRW; (ix) the development of technical cooperation 
needs to promote and implement the Declaration principles and rights; and (x) the 
increased pace of ratification of the ILO fundamental Conventions.’81
In terms of the regulatory role in the global space, these mechanisms clearly show 
a hybrid constellation between traditional rule-setting by the ILO core Conventions, 
which are broadened into standards by the 1998 Declaration, and problem-solving 
mechanisms of the Follow-up to the Declaration. More specifically, the latter exists of 
mechanisms that create a bottom-up process based on which problems are identified 
and solutions are sought by the involvement of several stakeholders, the collection and 
dissemination of information, and deliberation and cooperation. 
The third regulatory initiative of the ILO is the Tripartite Declaration of principles con-
cerning multinational enterprises. The Tripartite Declaration intents to ‘guide the gov-
ernments, the employers’ and workers’ organizations and the multinational enterprises 
in taking such measures and actions and adopting such social policies, including those 
based on the principles laid down in the Constitution and the relevant Conventions 
and Recommendations of the ILO, as would further social progress’.82 Furthermore, 
it refers to the 1998 Declaration and the core labour Conventions that are to be com-
plied with by the governments as well as the MNEs.83 The Tripartite Declaration differs 
significantly from the 1998 Declaration since its personal and material scope is wider. 
MNEs belong to its target group and it is not confined to the fundamental principles 
and rights at work, but also covers principles on labour issues such as the promotion 
and protection of employment, training, and conditions of work and life. For each 
subject it is emphasised that governments should ratify the related Conventions if 
they have not done so yet, whereas MNEs are to abide by the laws and policies of the 
countries they are active in. Indirectly, it is pointed out to MNEs which standards they 
should at least uphold.84 More particularly, MNEs are encouraged to implement the 
principles of the Tripartite Declaration into their daily business policies. 
80 M. N’Diaye, ‘The Annual Review and the promotion of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work: Developments and initial impact assessment’, op cit, 414-415, 
note 76.
81 M. N’Diaye, ‘The Annual Review and the promotion of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Funda-
mental Principles and Rights at Work: Developments and initial impact assessment’, op cit, 426, 
note 76. In the remainder of this chapter, N’Diaye gives an elaborate analysis of all of these 
mechanisms.
82 Art 5 of the Tripartite Declaration.
83 Art 8-10 of the Tripartite Declaration.
84 For instance, Art 58 of the Tripartite Declaration, which holds references to ILO Recommenda-
tion 130 concerning the Examination of Grievances within the Undertaking with a view to Their 
Settlement, and, more relevant to this paper, to all eight fundamental Conventions of the ILO 
dealing with the CLSs.
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How MNEs are to implement these principles into their ordinary business policies is 
not specified. This is done in the separate MULTI programme.85 MULTI aims to raise 
awareness about the existence of the Tripartite Declaration, and to this end encom-
passes several key means of action. These actions include a ‘helpdesk’ for business on 
CLSs that provides tools and resources to assist managers and workers of MNEs on 
how they can better align business operations with the CLSs and on how they can 
build good industrial relations.86 Other key means of action are capacity building and 
training activities by the ILO training centre in Turin; projects on topic areas of the 
Tripartite Declaration; and including the Tripartite Declaration into the mainstream of 
other ILO policies, among which those promoting CSRs, through collaboration of the 
ILO with other international organisations such as ‘the UN Global Compact, the OECD, 
and ISO’.87
In essence, the Tripartite Declaration and its follow-up programme MULTI regulate the 
ILO CLSs in a similar way as the 1998 Declaration and its Follow-up. The Tripartite 
Declaration broadens the rights of the ILO Conventions into standards and principles 
to be incorporated in the ordinary business policies of MNEs; the MULTI programme 
provides the (problem-solving) mechanisms to help MNEs achieve this. More specifi-
cally, the main mechanisms of the MULTI programme include experimentation, dis-
semination of knowledge, and the creation of the participation of stakeholders. The lat-
ter includes governments (concerning ratification and implementation of the relevant 
ILO Conventions), management and workers’ representatives of MNEs, several bodies 
and committees of the ILO, and collaboration with other international organisations.88
Regarding the hybrid configuration of these initiatives with the ILO core Conven-
tions the following can be noticed. The Conventions themselves form a transformative 
hybrid configuration with the ILO supervisory system by which the implementation 
of the Conventions in general is monitored. The supervisory system is a sophisticated 
system that not only relies on traditional command and control mechanisms, but also 
on problem-solving mechanisms.89 The latter role is further elaborated and enforced 
by the governance efforts and activities that are undertaken under the two declarations: 
the 1998 Declaration and the Tripartite Declaration. Moreover, the hybrid configura-
tion with the 1998 Declaration and its Follow-up can be considered transformative as 
well, since their ultimate aim is the ratification and implementation of the ILO core 
Conventions. To achieve this the rights in the core Conventions are broadened by 
the 1998 Declaration into standards. Furthermore, the Follow-up programme provide 
mechanisms to help countries that have not (yet) ratified the core Conventions and 
aim to identify the problems the countries encounter, to address those problems and 
to solve them in order to pave the path for the ratification of the Conventions. 
Also the Tripartite Declaration and the MULTI programme form a transformative con-
figuration with the ILO core Conventions. The Tripartite Declaration broadens the 




88 http://www.ilo.org/empent/units/multinational-enterprises/lang--en/index.htm. Interestingly, 
this webpage also holds a reference to the website of UN Global Compact. On the other hand, 
since both are part of the UN, (even though the ILO was constituted in 1919, it became a spe-
cialised agency of the UN in 1946) it is not that surprising.
89 Cf D. A. Morse, The Origin and Evolution of the I.L.O. and Its Role in the World Community (New York State 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Itaca, 1969), 37-73. On this in the 
wider concept of soft law/new governance, see also B. P. ter Haar, Open Method of Coordination. An 
analysis of its meaning for the development of a social Europe (Leiden University Press, Leiden, 2012), 44-48.
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employers’ and workers’ organisations. Furthermore, it encourages MNEs to incor-
porate the CLSs into their ordinary business policies. Secondly, it recognises the ILO 
core Conventions as being the predominant rule-setter of CLSs, which can be deduced 
from the fact that it refers to the core Conventions whenever possible. The Tripartite 
Declaration itself forms a transformative configuration with the MULTI programme. 
Their configuration is rather similar as the one between the 1998 Declaration and its 
Follow-up: the Tripartite Declaration broadens the core labour rights into standards, 
whereas the MULTI programme includes problem-solving mechanisms that aim to 
support MNEs to identify problems and help to overcome them in order to implement 
the CLSs into their day-to-day business policies. 
Besides the recognition of the ILO core Conventions as the predominant rule-setting 
initiative, the Tripartite Declaration intends to be complementary to other initiatives 
as well, since it explicitly recognises the coexistence of the 1998 Declaration and the 
initiatives of other international organisations, including UN Global Compact and the 
OECD Guidelines. This is a consciously designed complementarity, since the Tripartite 
Declaration promotes and encourages collaboration with these initiatives, making it a 
well-embedded initiative in the global space of ILO CLSs.
B. OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, adopted in 1976, ‘are recommen-
dations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from 
adhering countries. They provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible 
business conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws and internation-
ally recognised standards.’90 The Guidelines aim to promote positive contributions by 
enterprises to economic, environmental and social progress worldwide. They clarify 
shared expectations for business conduct of the governments and provide a point of 
reference for enterprises and other stakeholders. Consequently, they ‘both complement 
and reinforce private efforts to define and implement responsible business conduct’.91 
The labour rights to be taken into account by the enterprises include the core labour 
rights of the ILO (Section v: Employment and Industrial Relations of the Guidelines). 
These rights are further clarified by the commentaries, which include elaborate refer-
ences to the ILO Conventions.92 Hence, the Guidelines do not formulate new norms; 
they promote the implementation of the norms defined by the ILO Conventions. To 
support an effective implementation of the norms, the Guidelines oblige the adhering 
Member States to establish National Contact Points (NCPs). The NCPs have three main 
tasks: 1. to make the Guidelines known and available; 2. to raise awareness of the 
Guidelines and their implementation procedures; and 3. to respond to enquiries about 
the Guidelines. These tasks are conducted in cooperation with and in the service of the 
business community, workers’ organisations, other non-governmental organisations, 
the interested public, other NCPs and governments of adhering countries.93 The latter 
task, to respond to enquiries, includes the resolution of issues that arise as a result of 
the implementation of the Guidelines in ‘specific instances’. In other words, the NCP 
will operate as a dispute settlement body in case of alleged non-observance with the 
Guidelines.94 These ‘specific instances’ are dealt with in three phases:
90 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition, 3. 
91 Ibid, 15.
92 Ibid, 37-41.
93 Ibid, Part II: Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 72.
94 Ibid, 72-74 (C. Implementation in Specific Instances). 
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1. ‘Initial assessment: to determine if the issues raised merit further examination.
2. Offer of good offices: to seek advice and facilitate access to consensual and non-
adversarial means to resolve the issues.
3. Conclusion: to issue statements or reports.’95
An action for a ‘specific instance’ can be initiated by all organisations involved with 
the implementation of the Guidelines, including the business community, workers’ 
organisations, and other NGOs.96 In terms of regulatory mechanisms, this qualifies as 
a traditional command and control mechanism: norms formulated in the Guidelines 
are observed by a special body, the NCPs, based on actions of alleged non-compliance. 
Since 2011 (the last update of the Guidelines) the ‘specific instance’ has been com-
plemented by a ‘proactive agenda’ in order to help ‘enterprises identify and respond 
to risks of adverse impacts associated with particular products, regions, sectors or 
industries’.97 Here too the NCPs have a pivotal role, since they maintain regular con-
tact with social partners and other stakeholders. Three projects have been initiated in 
this context: due diligence in the financial sector; stakeholder engagement and due 
diligence in the extractive sector; and responsible investment in agricultural supply 
chains.98 In regulatory terms this means that the command and control mechanism of 
the ‘specific instance’ is complemented with a problem-solving mechanism identifying 
the problems and supporting enterprises to find solutions in order to prevent situations 
of non-compliance. 
As for hybridity, the Guidelines are positioned between public law initiatives, ie all 
three ILO initiatives on the one hand and the private initiatives of the MNEs on the 
other hand, among which unilateral CSR policies as well as IFAs (see below section 
Iv.B and Iv.C). More specifically, the Guidelines do not formulate new labour stand-
ards nor intend to do so. They clearly recognise the ILO as the competent body to set 
international labour standards: ‘the OECD Guidelines and the ILO MNE Declaration 
refer to the behaviour expected from enterprises and are not intended to parallel and 
not conflict each other’.99 Moreover, since the Tripartite Declaration of the ILO is more 
elaborate it can be of use for the interpretation of the Guidelines. Only the responsibili-
ties for the follow-up procedures are to remain institutionally separate.100 This refers in 
particular to the NCPs and the system of ‘specific instances’ that are complemented by 
the proactive agenda. Given the strong and emphasised link with the ILO initiatives and 
its regulatory mechanisms, the hybrid configuration could be qualified as transforma-
tive, in the sense of an extra forum to promote the implementation of the ILO CLSs, in-
cluding an extra mechanism to observe compliance and to preventively tackle possible 
problems. The added, transformative value in the OECD Guidelines lies in the fact that 
they address the enterprises and that those enterprises’ compliance can be observed, 
while the ILO can only do this with respect to its Member States. The same mecha-
nisms are complementary to the private initiatives of the enterprises that have their 
seat in the countries that adhere to the OECD Guidelines. It is complementary to the 
initiatives that provide well-elaborated implementation and compliance mechanisms,
95 Ibid, 72-73; and http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/specificinstances.html.




99 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition, 37 (Commentary 48).
100 Ibid.
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hence could be considered transformative with respect to initiatives that provide weak 
or lack such mechanism.101 
 
C. Un Global Compact
UN Global Compact is not the first initiative of the UN that appeals to companies to 
act in a socially responsible way. However, having learned lessons on the difficulties 
to adopt a legally binding initiative,102 UN Global Compact evolved as a voluntary, 
non-binding strategic policy platform that intends to be politically authoritative, but 
is legally non-binding.103 Furthermore, it is a multi-stakeholder platform, including 
businesses and non-business entities, among which NGOs, business associations, and 
workers’ organisations. The platform of UN Global Compact enables them to proac-
tively network and engage in the areas of the ten principles.104 Within the context 
of UN Global Compact different activities are undertaken which all stakeholders can 
participate in. These activities include for instance training, meetings and workshops 
on specific subjects, local networks and webinar series. 
The intended authority is based on the content of UN Global Compact: the ten prin-
ciples. In this respect the UN Special Representative, John Ruggie, emphasises that 
the core elements of these principles have also been adopted by other international 
standard-setting bodies, among which the OECD, ISO and the European Union.105 
More particularly concerning the labour rights, general reference is made to the ILO 
1998 Declaration and the ILO Helpdesk for Business on International Labour Standards, 
which is part of MULTI (see above section III.A), whereas it is also recognised that the 
ILO Conventions are the regulatory source for the labour rights.106 
The monitoring of the compliance with the ten principles under the programme is 
weak, since it merely requires the participating businesses to annually submit Com-
munication on Progress (COP) reports. These COP reports are not verified. Instead, UN 
Global Compact relies on ‘fire alarms’ raised by the public or civil society, for instance 
by highlighting cases of poor performance or disingenuous reporting.107 A firm that 
fails to submit a COP is first listed as ‘non-communicating’ and after two years as ‘in-
101 For example: the IUF (a GUF) has initiated a ‘specific instance’ against Accor, whereas they 
also have concluded an IFA with Accor. The issue at stake was the establishment of trade 
unions in three hotels. A right that is part of the IFA and the Guidelines. Both refer to the ILO 
Conventions on this issue. The IFA stipulates that any differences arising from the implemen-
tation of the agreement are to be examined jointly – by the management of Accor and the 
IUF (http://www.iuf.org/cgi-bin/dbman/db.cgi?db=default&ww=1&uid=default&ID=163&vi
ew_records=1&en=1). Hence, recourse has been sought to the procedure of the OECD: http://
mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/instances/fr0012.htm.
102 Cf J. G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, op cit, 55-80; R. M. M. Wallace 
& O. Martin-Ortega, ‘The UN Norms: A First Step to Universal Regulation of Transnational Cor-
porations’ Responsibilities for Human Rights?’, (2004) 26 Dublin University Law Journal, 304-319; 
and P. P. Miretski & S. D. Bachmann, ‘The UN “Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”: A Requiem’, op cit.
103 J. G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, op cit, xlii-xliv; and G. Kell, 
’12 Years Later: Reflections on the Growth of the UN Global Compact’, (2013) 52 Business & 
Society 1, 31-52.
104 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html.
105 J. G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, op cit, xxi.
106 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/Labour/index.html.
107 D. Berliner & A. Prakash, ‘From norms to programs: The United Nations Global Compact and 
global governance’, (2012) Regulation and Governance, 4, note 110. 
BINNENWERK_nr2_2013_110774.indd   85 19/11/13   11:49
EJSL
86
EUROPEAN  JOURNAL  OF  SOC IA L  LAW   /    N o  2  .  J u n e  2 0 1 3
active’. The latter means that the company can no longer use the logo of UN Global 
Compact or participate in any of the events. A company can return to the active status 
by simply submitting a COP report.108 
With regard to the regulatory mechanism set by UN Global Compact, the above al-
ready makes clear that the programme does not intend to be a rule-setter itself. On 
the contrary, it aims to make the ten principles mainstream in business strategy and 
operations around the world and to catalyse business action in support of UN goals and 
issues.109 Therefore, it is deliberately designed as ‘non-hierarchical and non-regulatory 
in character. It is visualised as a learning network rather than a compliance-based 
standard, focussing on “norm-diffusion and the dissemination of practical know-how 
and tools”.’110
However, the regulatory capacity of UN Global Compact lies not so much with its 
monitoring mechanism, but with its influential diffusion as an inspiration and learn-
ing platform for other, private initiatives.111 Consequently, UN Global Compact fol-
lows ‘the logics of appropriateness’ (conduct based on notions of duty, responsibility, 
identity and obligations), rather than ‘the logics of consequences’ (conduct based on 
expected gains and losses).112
UN Global Compact is complemented by the Ruggie Framework, which is comprised 
of three pillars: the duty of a state to protect human rights; the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights; and access to remedy.113 Regarding regulatory mechanisms, 
the Ruggie Framework can be characterised as rule-setting. Under the first two pil-
lars, rules are set about the sort of behaviour that is expected of states and corpora-
tions when implementing the ten principles, whereas the third pillar foresees in a 
mechanism of ex post control with the emphasis on remediating proven infringements 
of one of the ten principles. Although the Ruggie Framework is also legally non-
binding, it has been received as a positive addition to the Global Compact programme, 
since it provides an extra incentive and legitimacy for companies to take their social 
responsibility,114 either via the adoption of unilateral codes of conduct, or, as promoted 
by the Global Compact programme, by IFAs115.116 
In terms of hybrid configurations it can be noted that UN Global Compact recognises 
all other international and transnational regulatory initiatives. Regarding the ILO it can 
be considered as transformative, since it consciously promotes the implementation of 
the CLSs as defined by the 1998 ILO Declaration and the ILO core Conventions. In 
fact, it adds an extra regulatory mechanism to that of the ILO, which is characterised 
108 Ibid.
109 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html and M. vinkovic , ‘The role of Soft 
Law Methods (CSR) in Labour Law’, 2012, paper presented at MTA-PTE Research Group of Labour Law 
Conference on Recent Developments in Labour Law, Hungary. Available at http://mta-pte.ajk.pte.hu/index.
php?lang=en&link=conference. 
110 D. Berliner & A. Prakash, ‘From norms to programs: The United Nations Global Compact and 
global governance’, op cit, 1-18 (citation: 3-4); and J. G. Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: 
The Evolving International Agenda’, (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law, 819-840 (cita-
tion: 820).
111 Ibid, 6-8.
112 J. G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, op cit, 106.
113 J. G. Ruggie, ‘Report of the Special representative of the Secretary-general on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’, 2011, Report submitted to 
the UN Human Rights Council, A/hrc/17/31. 
114 Cf J. G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, op cit, 166-169.
115 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/Labour/Global_Framework_Agreements.html.
116 Sections Iv.B and Iv.C illustrate that a majority of the unilateral CSR codes of conduct and IFAs 
indeed refer to the UN Global Compact as a source. 
’
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by problem-solving and norm-infringing preventive activities and the dissemination 
of information and practices. It recognises the OECD Guidelines; however, it does not 
seem to seek connection with the OECD’s national contact points. Instead it promotes 
and supports the development of local networks. Although the OECD and UN Global 
Compact both operate in the national setting and aim to support the implementation 
of the CLSs by companies, they can be considered as complementary rather than ri-
valry, albeit unconsciously. First of all, they operate on different levels – national and 
local – and secondly, they focus on different techniques – serving as a dispute resolu-
tion body and providing proactive support on themes with respect to certain potential 
risks of infringements versus the dissemination of information and best practices and 
deliberation with (local) peers. UN Global Compact also recognises the importance 
of private initiatives. NGOs are recognised as an important partner, in particular with 
respect to the ‘fire alarm’ system regarding the validity of the COP reports, and in 
general for advocating the programme as an authoritative template to be followed in 
the private initiatives of the companies. Hence, it promotes the use of IFAs as effective 
initiatives to advance the implementation of the Global Compact labour principles and 
to improve industrial relations.
Iv. GOvERNANCE MECHANISMS AND HYBRIDITY OF PRIvATE REGULATO-
RY INITIATIvES
This section analyses the governance mechanisms and hybridity of private regulatory 
initiatives. Although the private regulatory initiatives have been divided into three 
groups – initiatives of NGOs; unilateral codes of conduct of MNEs; and bi/multilateral 
initiatives involving at least the management of an MNE and workers’ representatives 
– there is no homogeneity within these groups. More precisely, there is no ‘standard 
form’ for these initiatives. In particular in the early days, they were self-inventory, not 
only because the actors involved lacked experience in regulating labour issues on the 
transnational level, but also because they ‘cannot reason back their actions and prefer-
ences on the basis of the present possibilities or on trajectories travelled by those they 
relate to, such as their inspiration models, their peers, their opponents, or otherwise’.117 
Because of the significant increase of these kind of private initiatives since the 1990s, 
growing experience, and the development of standards to draw from, this nevertheless 
seems to be slowly changing.118 This heterogeneity within these groups has implica-
tions for the analysis. This is overcome partly by making a selection of initiatives and 
partly by focusing the analysis on possible tendencies found in the selected initiatives 
themselves, complemented by findings in empirical case studies. 
117 L. Fransen, Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Labour Standards. Firms and Activists in the Making of Private 
Regulation (Routledge, London/New York, 2012), 24.
118 This can be deduced from some empirical case studies, showing that MNEs have adjusted their 
CSR strategies over the course of time in efforts to make them more effective. However, it goes 
beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on this. For further reading on this, see among oth-
ers R. M. Locke, ‘Private efforts to improve global working conditions have failed’, (2013) Boston 
Review, available at http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/can-global-brands-create-just-supply-
chains-richard-locke?; L. Fransen, Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Labour Standards. Firms and Activ-
ists in the Making of Private Regulation, op cit; and D. Stevis, ‘The Impacts of International Framework 
Agreements: Lessons from the Daimler case’, op cit.
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A. Initiatives of non-governmental organisations (a selection)
As described in section II.C above NGOs are not homogeneous groups, since they have 
different aims and focus areas. Nonetheless, they also have similarities. Therefore, this 
section provides a description of the regulatory mechanisms the initiatives of NGOs 
have in common, which is complemented with relevant differing details of organisa-
tions according to the distinction made in section II.C, and as has been brought for-
ward in the literature.119 
When it comes to human rights observance within MNEs, these organisations, as well 
as some firms themselves, have in common that they are frustrated by the inability of 
the traditional systems of national and international public organisations to effectively 
address labour rights.120 Secondly, NGOs share the believe that as a consequence of this 
regulatory gap many MNEs have become dangerous mixes of power and unaccount-
ability. In response, NGOs have created transnational networks that target these cor-
porations.121 In general, the strategy of NGOs is to create pressure by shaming brands 
(MNEs) in public opinions for not taking responsibility for their actions and their 
suppliers concerning labour rights, environmental and social issues. Consequently, 
MNEs are pushed to adopt CSR policies and have their actions monitored and audited 
for compliance therewith. NGOs provide labour standards MNEs are to observe in their 
CSR policies. The monitoring and auditing can be done by the MNEs themselves, but 
more and more this is done by NGOs.122 The monitoring and auditing is also more 
and more backed up by sanctions (among which formal sanctions, eg legal penalisation, 
associational sanctions like expulsion from accreditation regimes, and informal sanc-
tions including public pressure and corporate campaigns) and incentives (eg naming by 
certificates and capability building).123 
NGOs differ in the formulation of the labour standards that are to be observed. How-
ever, research indicates that they are converging towards the ILO CLSs.124 Furthermore, 
they differ in ‘procedures for auditing (who conducts the monitoring and how), 
certification (whether a factory or brand is certified), and reporting (what is publicly 
119 For an elaborate account of NGO strategies to promote CSRs, see M. Winston, ‘NGO Strategies 
for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility’, (2002) 16 Ethics and International Affairs 2, 71-87. 
For more elaborate descriptions of labour right NGOs, see D. O’Rourke, ‘Outsourcing Regula-
tion: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring’, (2003) 31 The 
Policy Studies Journal 1, 1-29; and for a description of NGOs by characteristics L. Fransen, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Global Labour Standards. Firms and Activists in the Making of Private Regulation, op cit, 
195-196.
120 D. O’Rourke, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards 
and Monitoring’, op cit.
121 Cf J. Bakan, The Corporation. The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Constable, London, 2004), 
27; and L. Fransen & B. Burgoon, ‘Global Labour-Standards Advocacy by European Civil Society 
Organizations: Trends and Developments’, (2013) British Journal of Industrial Relations. 
122 C. Sabel, D. O’Rourke, & A. Fung, ‘Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Im-
provement in the Global Workplace’, 2000, KSG Working Paper No 00-010, available at http://
www.law.columbia.edu/lawec/.
123 D. O’Rourke, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards 
and Monitoring’, op cit, 10-11; C. Sabel, D. O’Rourke & A. Fung, ‘Ratcheting Labor Standards: 
Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace’, op cit, 33; and most elaborate-
ly on this: M. Winston, ‘NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility’, (2002) 
16 Ethics and International Affairs 2, 71-87.
124 R. van Tulder & A. Kolk, ‘Multinationality and Corporate Ethics: Codes of Conduct in the Sport-
ing Goods Industry’, (2001) 32 Journal of International Business Studies 2, 267-283; D. O’Rourke, ‘Out-
sourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring’, 
op cit, 7.
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disclosed)’.125 The main consequence of these differences lies with the effectiveness in 
changing labour practices in MNEs and there global supply chains.126
Concerning the regulatory mechanisms, empirical case studies show a tendency away 
from traditional compliance programmes (mostly audits) sought to deter violations of 
codes of conducts and penalising factories, towards, what Locke calls ‘capability-build-
ing’ mechanisms that seek to prevent violations by ‘providing the skills, technology, 
and organizational skills that enable factories to enforce labor standards [and improve 
working conditions] on their own’.127 Consequently, the scope of actors involved is 
also broadened from mainly management to all relevant stakeholders that are, with 
(financial) support and training, enabled to step up where appropriate and necessary. 
Furthermore, it includes a movement from fixed rules to be complied with towards 
ongoing deliberation focusing on finding solutions to prevent violations. A tendency 
that was, in theory, elaborated on by Sabel, O’Rourke and Fung in 2000,128 noted 
by O’Rourke in 2003, and by Fransen and Burgoon in 2013, all analysing regulatory 
efforts of different NGOs,129 which can also be seen in the brief characterisations of 
six NGOs in Box 1. In terms of regulatory mechanisms used in this paper, this means 
a tendency moving away from command and control rule-setting towards multi-
stakeholder deliberative problem-solving. 
When considering hybridity between these NGO initiatives and the ILO CLSs, the 
following can be noticed. Of the six NGOs characterised in Box 1, only two make 
no reference to any other initiative at all, whereas the other four make explicit refer-
ence to the ILO Conventions and two also to UN initiatives. When this is combined 
with the sort of regulatory mechanisms that are in general applied, problem-solving, 
a convincing impression arises of NGO initiatives aiming to be complementary to the 
ILO Conventions. While the ILO sets the standards and norms in the Conventions, 
their implementation is promoted and supported by the initiatives of NGOs. This is 
in particularly so when considering the fact that for the vast majority of the NGOs 
(five out of six in Box 1) the emphasis is on implementation mechanisms that support 
management efforts to improve their performance towards full compliance with the 
labour standards. Although it would go too far to qualify this form of hybridity as 
transformative, it comes close when it is emphasised that NGOs are able to press com-
panies to participate in their schemes, while the ILO (and other public organisations) 
lacks force and means to do so. 
125 D. O’Rourke, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards 
and Monitoring’, op cit, 11; with an overview of differences in these systems of FLA, SA8000 and 
Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production, at 12 and 13.
126 D. O’Rourke, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards 
and Monitoring’, op cit, 19. An issue that will not be further addressed since it exceeds the scope 
of this contribution.
127 R. M. Locke, ‘Private efforts to improve global working conditions have failed’, op cit.
128 Ibid.
129 D. O’Rourke, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards 
and Monitoring’, op cit, 19-20; L. Fransen & B. Burgoon, ‘Global Labour-Standards Advocacy by 
European Civil Society Organizations: Trends and Developments’, op cit, 21-22, note 15.
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Box 1. The summarised characteristics of six nGOs
The issues used to characterise the NGOs are: the standards formulated, including references to other 
initiatives; actors involved; implementation and compliance mechanisms; and sanctions/incentives.
1. Human Rights Watch (HRW)
(www.hrw.org) 
HRW promotes human rights in its broadest sense, including the issues of child 
labour and forced labour, however, without making reference to specific norms. 
HRW conducts regular, systematic investigations into human rights abuses around 
the world (more than 90 countries). Their investigations aim to come to a full 
understanding of the incident in which rights have been violated and to gain a 
strong sense of the local political, social, and cultural context of the violation. While 
conducting an investigation, HRW relies on information from local human rights 
activists, lawyers, journalists and civil society members as well as state and govern-
ment officials.
The working method of HRW is not merely issuing reports on the status of human 
rights. In particular where problems are signalled, the reporting is complemented 
by an advocacy approach. This means that not only violations, victims and violators 
are identified, but that it is also determined ‘who can and should take responsibility 
for stopping rights violations and providing redress, the detailed and specific steps 
they need to take, and who else can bring influence and leverage to bear’.
HRW uses ‘shaming’ via expressing public opinions in order to press for attention 
for the violated rights. Once attention is gained the HRW researchers engage in a 
persuasive and constructive dialogue with a wide range of possible influential actors 
in order to tackle and stop the violations.
2. Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI)
(www.ethicaltrade.org) 
The ETI is an alliance of companies, trade unions and voluntary organisations that 
work in partnership in order to improve the working life of poor and vulnerable 
workers across the globe. 
Companies that want to participate in the ETI have to adopt the ETI Base Code 
which is based on ILO Conventions. Furthermore, the have to sign up to the ETI’s 
Principles of Implementation, which require companies to demonstrate clear com-
mitment to ethical trade; to integrate ethical trade into their core business practices; 
to stimulate year-on-year improvements of working conditions; to support suppliers 
to improve working conditions; and to report openly and accurately about their 
activities. Besides self-reports, the ETI secretariat, together with trade union repre-
sentatives and NGO members, conducts random validation visits to a minimum of 
twenty per cent of the reporting companies. Except for consolidation of the com-
pany reports, the visits also aim to build dialogue about the progress that is made 
and problems that arise.
Alleged violations of the base code are not backed up by sanctions. Instead a proce-
dure is in place for investigation and remediation. Investigation is conducted by the 
ETI Member company, who is also responsible for negotiating a remediation plan 
with the (violating) supplier. The plan is to take into account the nature of the vio-
lation and the type of remediation required. For the latter, solutions can be drawn 
from good practices that have been disseminated by the ETI secretariat as found in 
either annual reports of other Member companies or of pilots (see the ETI Alleged
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Code violation Guidelines). Moreover, instead of shaming brands and lead compa-
nies, ETI offers a platform to exchange good practice in order to improve working 
conditions within their supply chain by building capability through partnerships.
3. Social Accountability International (SAI): SA8000 Standard
(www.sa-intl.org) 
The SA8000 standard is a certification system for decent workplaces. It is based 
on the Conventions of the ILO and the UN. It aims to create a common language 
among industry and corporate codes in order to measure social compliance. 
It uses a management system approach by setting out the structures and procedures 
companies must adopt to ensure that compliance with the code is continuously 
reviewed. 
Compliance with the code is initially reviewed by the company that applies for the 
certificate. This is audited by an independent SAAS-accredited Certification Body. In 
case non-conformity is found, corrective actions are to be taken in due time after 
the non-compliances have been identified. Since the certificate represents a pro-
cedure and performance-type process, the emphasis is on improving performance 
rather than products that have been produced in full compliance with the labour 
standards. Secondly, the support offered by SAI therefore exists of information 
about the standards, capacity building and technical assistance, including SA8000 
auditor training seminars and professional development workshops. 
SA8000 is not backed up by negative sanctions, such as a certification withdrawal. 
Instead it provides positive incentives, like discussing the problems and identifying 
non-conformances and defining corrective actions.
4. ISO26000
(www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm) 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) holds a portfolio of over 
18.400 standards providing business, government and society with practical tools 
for sustainable development. 
Unlike other standards, eg 14.000 on environment, ISO 26000 is not for certifi-
cation purposes. Hence, it facilitates trade, spreads knowledge, disseminates in-
novative advances in technology and shares good management and conformity 
assessment practices. ISO provides positive reasons for companies to participate, 
for example: competitive advantage, reputation, and relationships with companies, 
governments, the media, suppliers, peer customers and the community in which 
they operate. More particularly, ISO 26000 deals with social responsibility and pro-
vides guidance. This guidance includes the definition of concepts and terms related 
to social responsibility; principles and practices; the integration, implementation 
and promotion of social responsible behaviour throughout the organisation; the 
identification and engagement with stakeholders; and communication of commit-
ments and performance on social responsibility. 
It is not backed up by negative sanctions, but focuses on support and facilitations 
in order for a company to improve an organisation’s contribution to social respon-
sibility in particular and sustainable development in general. 
5. Fair Labor Association (FLA)
(www.fairlabor.org)
Companies that join the FLA are to commit to 10 Principles of Fair Labor and 
Responsible Sourcing and have to agree to uphold the FLA Workplace Code of 
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Conduct throughout the entire supply chain. The code is based on the ILO standards 
and internationally accepted good labour practices.
The FLA has developed a multi-stakeholder approach including three key constitu-
ents: universities, civil society organisations (including trade unions) and compa-
nies.
The FLA replaced its conventional checklist auditing system that revealed the most 
egregious code violation and allowed for Band-Aid fixes with the Sustainable Com-
pliance methodology (SCI). This is essentially aimed at identifying and tackling 
violations in a sustainable way in order to prevent (repetitive) violations. Companies 
have to assess themselves (internal monitoring) and are assessed by FLA assessors, 
who collect information via local civil society organisations (including trade un-
ions), observations, interviews with management and workers (on- and off-site) 
and surveys. The information is processed and translated into findings and used to 
set priority actions. The reports are published on the website of FLA. The monitor-
ing is complemented with a third party complaint process which allows FLA to 
intervene rapidly when workers’ rights have been violated or are at risk. In this 
process all relevant stakeholders are involved, including civil society organisations, 
trade unions, government agencies and management.
FLA does not sanction its affiliates nor does it create strong incentives. Indirectly it 
holds a system of naming (incentive), since being accepted as an FLA affiliate means 
that the brand or company takes its CSR policy serious. 
6. Fair Wear Foundation (FWF)
(www.fairwear.org) 
The FWF works with companies and factories to improve labour conditions for 
garment workers. The FWF restricts its focus to the phases of production where 
sewing is the main manufacturing process (it is the most labour-intensive phase). 
The core of the FWF code is made up by eight labour standards derived from ILO 
Conventions and the UN Declaration on Human Rights. 
The FWF does not guarantee that products are produced in full compliance with its 
code (no product certification), but it verifies that its members work hard, step by 
step, to be in full compliance with the standards. Therefore, FWF applies a multi-
stakeholder approach by which the company compliance claims and performance 
activities are verified on three levels: factory level; company level and country level. 
The verification is not conducted via a command-control structure. Rather it is based 
on several forms of cooperation: cooperation between factories and companies; 
cooperation with other multi-stakeholder initiatives (eg the Jo-In Platform, which 
also involves the FLA); and cooperation with trade unions and business associations.
Since the verification is conducted by a third party, it enhances the credibility of 
the company regarding its claims of compliance with labour standards. As such, 
the system of the FWF provides mainly positive incentives for participation and 
no sanctions. This is enhanced by the FWF’s aim, which is to support participat-
ing companies, on a step-by-step basis, to effectively implement the FWF Code of 
Labour practices. Although the FWF requires companies to provide a complaint 
procedure on alleged violations, the emphasis lies with corrective action plans and 
verifiable improvements, and capability training. 
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B. Unilateral initiatives by MnEs
In general, CSR initiatives are a response of MNEs to deal with the negative effects of 
economic globalisation on labour rights, such as low wages, long working hours and 
poor health and safety conditions in their increasingly complex global supply chains.130 
As indicated in the introduction of this section the content and form of the unilateral 
initiatives by MNEs (further referred to as CSR codes of conduct) vary significantly. The 
data of the sample that is used for the analysis in this paper indicate that this variety 
is unrelated to sector or region as is sometimes presumed in the literature. Insofar as a 
general statement can be made, it may be noted that most of the CSR codes of conduct 
do not exist of merely one document, but of several related documents that address 
several aspects of corporate governance. These may include documents dealing with 
business ethics (business code of conduct), human rights (code of conduct), environ-
mental and societal issues (often existing of several actions described on the website of 
the MNE), and a ‘whistle blowing’ policy (see table 1).
When analysing the content of the sample of twenty CSR strategies it can be concluded 
that, in general, MNEs do not intend to create labour standards. Only in three occasions 
no reference at all was found, whereas the vast majority refers to public initiatives or 
private initiatives of NGOs (see table 1). In this sample, most often referred to are the 
principles of the UN Global Compact and the ILO (especially Convention 182 on the 
abolition of child labour). Reference is also found to SA8000 (twice) and ISO 26000 
(once).131 Furthermore, it should be noted that not all companies refer to another 
initiative, whereas their CSR policy is actually based on another initiative. This is for 
instance so for Nike: the website makes no reference to the Fair Labour Association, 
but Nike is involved in it and is one of the founding fathers.132 
As for the governance mechanisms the initiatives are rather vague. In general they 
formulate open standards or principles they aim to ensure within their company and 
their global production or service chain. Furthermore, they at best indicate that com-
pliance will be monitored – mostly by audits or reports – or that implementation will 
be supported – often via training and awareness raising about the existence of rights.133 
However, empirical case studies show that in practice these governance mechanisms 
are becoming more refined and complex. Moreover, some of these case studies indi-
cate a tendency that these mechanisms are developing from rather traditional compli-
ance and control mechanisms towards more supportive and preventive implementation 
mechanisms that aim for capability building throughout the company chain.134 In 
130 M. Anner, ‘The Limits of voluntary Governance Programmes: Auditing Labor Rights in the Glo-
bal Apparel Industry’, 2011, Project for Global Workers’ Rights, working paper 01, available at 
http://lser.la.psu.edu/gwr/projects.shtml#workingpapersproject, 2.
131 I have considered whether my selection is biased, because it includes companies that have been 
ranked highly by csrhub.com. To check this I have randomly picked one other company – San-
tander, a bank seated in the US – that is on the bottom of the list. Despite the low ranking, 
the CSR policy includes references to the UN GC, the OECD Guidelines, and the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration.
132 On this see also R. Jenkins, ‘The political economy of codes of conduct’, in R. Jenkins, R. Pearson 
& G. Seyfang (eds), Corporate Responsibility & Labour Rights. Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy (Earth-
scan, London, 2002), 19.
133 See for a more elaborate analysis of the content of CSRs: A. Kun & J. Hajdú, ‘Conceptualization 
of Corporate Social Responsibility in the Context of Labor Law’, in R. Blanpain, W. Bromwich, 
O. Rymkevich & I. Senatori (eds), Rethinking corporate Governance: From Shareholder Value to Stakeholder Value 
(Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011), 175-194.
134 For some interesting case studies on this, see R. M. Locke, ‘Private efforts to improve global 
working conditions have failed’, op cit, and for a similar development regarding IFAs, see sec-
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other words, the regulatory mechanisms are moving away from rule-setting towards 
problem-solving.
With respect to hybrid configurations, this sample of twenty unilateral CSR codes 
indicates that the standards or principles that are promoted by the MNEs are based 
on the principles as set by public initiatives. Only three CSR codes of conduct make 
no reference to any initiative at all, whereas thirteen of these codes refer to the UN 
GC and eight of them to the ILO core Conventions. About nine codes even refer to 
more than one other initiative. With these references, the majority of MNEs recognise 
that the rules set by these public international organisations are guiding, resulting in 
a conscious complementary configuration. The high ranking could be a result of the 
participation in programmes like the UN GC, SA8000, ISO 26000 or of adherence to 
the OECD Guidelines. However, since this is also found for companies that are much 
lower ranked,135 it seems to be more related to the normative quality of the content 
and the implementation and compliance measures that are also part of those policies.136 
An insight that is supported by findings in empirical case studies and an upcoming 
tendency within companies that are striving for more effectiveness of their CSR poli-
cies in terms of implementation and compliance.137 Part of the development of the 
normative quality of the implementation and compliance mechanisms is the involve-
ment of all relevant stakeholders within more innovative forms of governance. These 
stakeholders include other private actors, such as SA8000 and the FLA, as well as public 
actors, among which international organisations like the UN GC and the ILO, but also 
national governments.138 
Furthermore, it can be concluded that a chain of complementary hybridity is created. 
The vast majority of CSR codes of conduct in this sample refers to the UN GC, which is 
based on the ILO core Conventions and both its declarations (see section III.B above). 
Thus, via the shackle of the UN GC, the implementation of the ILO core Conventions 
is complemented by the promotional activities of the MNEs themselves. From a regula-
tory point of view, the rule-setting role of the Conventions is, via the principles of the 
UN GC, complemented by the problem-solving regulatory mechanisms of the UN GC 
and the unilateral CSR policies of the MNEs themselves.
tion Iv.C and D. Stevis, ‘The Impacts of International Framework Agreements: Lessons from the 
Daimler case’, op cit. 
135 See footnote 95.
136 The normative quality of in particular the implementation and compliance policy of Santander 
(ranked at the bottom) is shallow compared to that of the sample of the twenty higher-ranked 
companies. Of course the effectiveness of private initiatives is more complex than only well-
developed implementation and compliance policies. This for instance also includes underpinning 
business strategies (business-driven CSRs or intrinsic human rights CSRs), legitimacy issues, 
internal power relationships, etc. About this see also J. Bakan, The Corporation. The Pathological Pursuit 
of Profit and Power, op cit; L. Fransen, Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Labour Standards. Firms and 
Activists in the Making of Private Regulation, op cit; and J. G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations 
and Human Rights, op cit.
137 Cf R. M. Locke, ‘Private efforts to improve global working conditions have failed’, op cit and for 
a similar finding with respect to IFAs: D. Stevis, ‘The Impacts of International Framework Agree-
ments: Lessons from the Daimler case’, op cit. 
138 Cf R. M. Locke, ‘Private efforts to improve global working conditions have failed’, op cit.
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Reference to other 
initiatives
1. Hewlett-Packard Business Code of 
Conduct, US public sector CoC, Con-
tingent workers CoC, CoC for suppliers 




Only in CoC sup- 
pliers to ILO CLS, 
UN GC, OECD, 
SA8000 and ETI
UN GC
2. HINDUSTAN ZINC LIMITED
Business Ethics & Code of Conduct
Industrial Asia/
Pacific
UN GC, SA8000, 
ILO Conv (in gen-
eral) and UN UDHR
3. TNT Express Business Principles UNI North
America
UN UDHR
4. Fluidra Code of Ethics IUF Europe UN GC, UN UDHR, 
ILO C182
5. Lonmin Code of Business Ethics,
Whistle Blowing Policy & Safety and
Sustainability Policy
Industrial Africa UN UDHR
6. Nokia Code of Conduct UNI Europe X
7. Westpac Group Code of Conduct 
& Diversity Policy & Whistle Blower 








8. Mondi Speakout policy & 5 principles
of business ethics (on website only)
BWI Europe UN GC





10. Management Consulting Group 
PLC Business ethics & Whistleblow-
ing & employees Group policy (webpage 
only)
UNI Europe UN GC
ILO C-182 and 
C-138
11. Eskom Ethical Business Conduct (in-
cludes whistleblowing hotline)
Industrial Africa UN GC139
12. Coca Cola Hellenic Code of Busi-
ness Conduct, Equality of Opportunity 
Policy, Human Rights Policy, Occupa-
tional H&S policy & Supplier Guiding 
Principles Policy
IUF Europe UN GC
139 http://www.eskom.co.za/c/article/246/un-global-compact/.
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Reference to other 
initiatives
13. Parsons Brinckerhoff Global 




UN UDHR (slavery 
and equal treatment)
Use of own defini-
tions / interpreta-
tions on equal treat-
ment and H&S
14. DSM Code of Business Conduct, Sup-
plier Code of Conduct, Whistleblower 
Policy and Procedure 
Industrial Europe ILO C-182 and 
C-138, UN GC*
15. Diageo Code of Business Conduct, 
Supplier Standards, Anti-Discrimina-
tion and Human Rights Global Policy
UNI Europe ILO core Conven-
tions; UN GC
16. Asiasat Code of Business Conduct 
and Ethics, Corporate Governance 
Guidelines
UNI Asia / 
Pacific
X
17. Sumitomo Internet-based policies, 
CSR with employees and with society 
BWI Asia / 
Pacific
UN GC / ISO 26000
Timber
18. Gap Inc. Human Rights Policy Industrial USA ILO core Conven-
tions, ILO Decl 
1998, UN GC, 
OECD GL, UN 
UDHR
19. ASUR UNI Latin 
America
X
20. BBvA Standards of Conduct and other 
commitments, Code of Conduct, report 
BBVA’s commitment to human rights
UNI Latin-
America
UN GC. UN UDHR, 
ILO Conv (in gen-
eral), OECD GL.
* Not mentioned in the codes, hence under the heading of ‘Stakeholder engagements’. 
C. Bi/multilateral agreements with workers’ organisations (IFAs)
Bi/multilateral agreements come in several varieties.141 However, this section is limited 
to agreements that are negotiated between management and labour with a transna-
tional coverage. Secondly, it is limited to agreements that involve the participation of 
global unions in their adoption and implementation. Although this excludes many
140 This is actually the Code of Conduct of Balfour Beatty, of which Parsons Brinkerhoff is a profes-
sional services division (sister company): http://www.balfourbeattyus.com/About-Us/Related-
Companies.
141 Cf K. Papadakis, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in K. Papadakis (ed), Shaping Global Industrial Relations. 
The Impact of International Framework Agreements’ (ILO/Palgrave, Geneva, 2011), 1-18 (at 1-2).
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other agreements,142 it offers a pragmatic advantage of empirical case studies about 
implementation and compliance mechanisms and qualitative data thereof, as well as 
quantitative data on references to some other global initiatives, among which the ILO 
initiatives, the OECD Guidelines, the UN Global Compact and SA8000. 
Being instruments that are negotiated between the management of one MNE and a 
GUF, the content varies per MNE, including the mechanisms for implementation and 
compliance. Some IFAs stress that it is the responsibility of the company – in excep-
tional cases only employees are made responsible for it – whereas most IFAs require 
both sides of the industry to ensure proper implementation.143 Similarly with regard 
to the unilateral initiatives of MNEs, a review of the literature on implementation 
mechanisms of IFAs learns that the IFAs themselves give scanty information about the 
governance mechanisms applied to ensure implementation and compliance.144 In prac-
tice, however, complex implementation and compliance mechanisms are applied.145 
With regard to the type of regulatory mechanism, a big strand of literature is search-
ing for traditional command and control regulatory rule-setting mechanisms to give 
direct effect to IFAs.146 However, given the lack of such a legal framework and the high 
improbability of the emergence of such a framework,147 empirical case studies show a 
growing awareness in practice of the development of implementation mechanisms.148 
More particularly, in some case studies a tendency is noted that is similar to a tendency 
in the initiatives of the majority of NGOs and CSR codes of MNEs, namely a (needed) 
move away from rather traditional command and control mechanisms towards sup-
portive and preventive implementation mechanisms that aim for capability building 
throughout the company chain.149 However, to what extent this is the case remains 
142 For instance, transnational collective agreements that are adopted by management and a Euro-
pean trade union and/or a European Works Council. About this see, for instance, I. Schönmann, 
R. Jagodzinski, G. Boni, S. Clauwaert, v. Glassner & T. Japsers, Transnational collective bargaining at 
company level. A new component of European industrial relations? (ETUI, Brussels, 2012).
143 C. Welz, ‘A Qualitative Analysis of International Framework Agreements: Implementation and 
Impact’, op cit, 39.
144 Among others: I. Schönmann, ‘The Impact of Transnational Company Agreements on Social 
Dialogue and Industrial Relations’, in K. Papadakis (ed), Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact 
of International Framework Agreements’ (ILO/Palgrave, Geneva, 2011), 21-37; C. Welz, ‘A Qualita-
tive Analysis of International Framework Agreements: Implementation and Impact’, op cit; and 
D. Stevis, ‘The Impacts of International Framework Agreements: Lessons from the Daimler case’, 
op cit.
145 See, for instance, G. Williams, S. Davies & C. Chinguno, ‘Subcontracting and Labour Standards: 
Reassessing the Potential of International Framework Agreements’, (2013) British Journal of Industrial 
Relations (early online publication).
146 See, for instance, I. Schönmann et al, Transnational collective bargaining at company level. A new component 
of European industrial relations (ETUI, Brussels, 2012); R. Krausse, ‘International Framework Agree-
ments as instrument for legal enforcement of freedom of association and collective bargaining? 
The German Case’, (2012) 33 Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, 749-743; and E. Ales, ‘Notes 
and Debates: Transnational collective bargaining in Europe: The case for legislative action at EU 
level’, (2009) 148 International Labour Review 1-2, 149-162. 
147 Eg R. Zimmer, ‘Establish a legal framework for transnational collective agreements in Europe: a 
difficult task’, 02/2012 Final report EUROACTA (chapter 2), available at www.ires.it. 
148 Cf D. Stevis, ‘The Impacts of International Framework Agreements: Lessons from the Daimler 
case’, op cit, on the IFA of Daimler; and more generally: A. Sobczak, ‘Ensuring the effective imple-
mentation of transnational company agreements’, (2012) 18 European Journal of Industrial Relations 
2, 139-151. 
149 See sections Iv.A and Iv.B above. See on IFAs in particular: D. Stevis, ‘The Impacts of Interna-
tional Framework Agreements: Lessons from the Daimler case’, op cit, on the IFA of Daimler; and 
more generally: A. Sobczak, ‘Ensuring the effective implementation of transnational company 
agreements’, op cit, 139-151.
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unclear, since less case studies have been conducted on this subject because most of 
them are conducted within the complex context of multi-level industrial relations and 
the capabilities and limits of trade unions in this respect.150 
With respect to hybridity, in terms of acknowledgement of other initiatives, in par-
ticular the ILO Conventions on the CLSs, tables 2 and 3 that are annexed to the book 
edited by Papadakis151 provide the information on 80 IFAs. These are represented in 
Table 2 below. This table shows that out of 80 IFAs, 69 refer to the ILO fundamental 
Conventions. More segregated data show that about 30 IFAs cover even more than the 
core rights with direct reference to the ILO Conventions, in particular Conventions 
135152 and 155153. Oppositely, eleven IFAs make no reference to the ILO fundamental 
Conventions. However, of these eleven IFAs, three refer to the ILO 1998 Declaration, 
one to two other initiatives, namely the OECD Guidelines and UN Global Compact, and 
one to SA8000. Of the remaining six IFAs, three refer to some CLSs, which leaves only 
three IFAs (Falck, Metro and UPU) that globally speaking seem to operate solitarily. 
This is actually only true for the IFA of UPU, which aims to establish cooperation to 
promote social dialogue. The IFA of Metro is slightly more specific and, with a bit of 
good will, an indirect reference to two fundamental Conventions can be read in it, 
namely to the Conventions on the right of association and on the right to collective 
bargaining. The IFA of Falk does not aim at the implementation of CLSs, but at the 
establishment of a world works council, which could be the first step towards a bi/
multilateral agreement that strives for the implementation of CLSs. On the other hand, 
there is also a substantial number of IFAs (sixteen) that refer to several other initiatives.
When the regulatory mechanism is taken into account, the vast majority seems to be 
merely repeating the standards of the ILO or those of other public initiatives. That is, if 
the tendency in (legal) literature about IFAs is followed that focuses on the creation of 
a legal framework in order to create direct effect. Such focus essentially mirrors a tra-
ditional command and control rule-setting approach. In terms of hybrid configurations 
this means that IFAs are not rivals with respect to the ILO Conventions; however, in 
terms of complementarity, they hardly add anything. Nevertheless, this might change 
when theoretical considerations and scarce good practices found in some empirical 
case studies as discussed above, are adopted and a shift is made towards implementa-
tion and compliance mechanisms similar to those found in the initiatives of NGOs and 
CSR codes of MNEs. When such a shift takes place, for which some indications can be 
found in, for instance, very recent research that was tendered by the European Trade 
Union Confederation,154 IFAs could very well become complementary in the sense of 
offering an additional regulatory mechanism to the ILO Conventions.
150 Among many others: P. Fairbrother & N. Hammer, ‘Global Unions: Past Efforts and Future 
Prospects’, (2005) 60 Industrial Relations 3, 405-431; v. Telljohan et al, ‘European and international 
framework agreements: new tools for transnational industrial relations’, (2009) 15 Transfer: Euro-
pean Review of Labour and Research 3-4, 505-525; and C. Crouch, ‘Collective Bargaining and transna-
tional corporations in the global economy. Some Theoretical considerations’, (2009) 1 International 
Journal of Labour research 2, 43-60.
151 K. Papadakis, ‘Introduction and Overview’, op cit, 249-258.
152 42 references. ILO Convention 135 is concerned with the Protection and Facilities to be Afforded 
to Workers’ Representatives in the Undertaking.
153 20 references. ILO Convention 155 is concerned with Occupational Safety and Health and the 
Working Environment.
154 For the call for the tender, see http://www.etuc.org/a/10789.
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Table 2. An overview of references in IFAs to other global initiatives
Initiative






69 Adecco; Brunel; Danske Bank; France Telecom; 
Freudenberg; Group 4 Securicor; Inditex; Kelly 
Services; Manpower; Nampak; Olympia Flexgroup; 
Randstad Holding; Renault; Shoprite Checkers; 
Statoil; Takashima; USG People; Wilkhahn; An-
glGold Ashanti; ArcelorMittal; BMW; Club Med; 
Daimler; Endesa; Evonik Industries; H&M; Hoch-
tief; Indesit Company; ISS; Leoni; National Aus-
tralia Group; Prym; Rheinmetall; Röchling; SCA; 
Schwan-Stabilo; Securitas; volkswagen; World Col-
or Press; Aker Solutions; Ballast Nedam; Chiquita; 
EADS; EDF; Elanders; ENI; Euradius; Faber-Castell; 
Fonterra; GEA; IKEA; Impreglio; Italcementi; La-
farge; Lukoil; Norske Skog; OTE; Portugal Tele-
com; PSA Peugeot; Rhodia; Royal BAM; Skanska; 
Staedtler; Telefónica; TEL-Telecomunicações; Umi-
core; vallourec; veidekke; volker-Wessels
ILO 1998 
Declaration
45 Accor; Citroën; Danone; Adecco; Brunel; Danske 
Bank; Freudenberg; Inditex; Kelly Services; Man-
power; Nampak; Olympia Flexgroup; Randstad 
Holding; USG People; Wilkhahn; Aker Solutions; 
Ballast Nedam; Chiquita; EADS; EDF; Elanders; ENI; 
Euradius; Faber-Castell; Fonterra; GEA; IKEA; Im-
preglio; Italcementi; Lafarge; Lukoil; Norske Skog; 
OTE; Portugal Telecom; PSA Peugeot; Rhodia; 
Royal BAM; Skanska; Staedtler; Telefónica; TEL-









11 Aker Solutions; Ballast Nedam; EADS; GEA; H&M; 
Impreglio; Inditex; ISS; Italcementi; Lafarge; WAZ
UN Global 
Compact
13 AnglGold Ashanti; BMW; Daimler; Danske Bank; 
EADS; EDF; France Telecom; 
H&M; Lafarge; Lukoil; PSA Peugeot; Renault; WAZ
SA8000 1 Carrefour
Source: Tables 2 and 3 annexed in K. Papadakis, Shaping Global Industrial Relations (ILO/Palgrave, Geneva, 
2011).
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v. HYBRID GLOBAL SPACE OF ILO CLSs: CONCLUSIONS
This contribution deals with the promotion of the ILO core labour standards at trans-
national level. These core labour standards cover the following subjects: forced labour, 
child labour, the right to collective bargaining and equal treatment. The underlying 
reason for this study is that there is a panoply of initiatives on the international and 
transnational level. Each of them has another function, focus or scope, but also an-
other governance mechanism to promote the implementation of these rights. Since 
these initiatives promote the same rights on the same regulatory level they inevitably 
interact. This interaction is negative when initiatives deliberately ignore each other’s 
existence or compete for dominance (rivalry). It is positive when the initiatives are 
complementary to each other or merge in a transformative configuration. The latter 
is the case when the two initiatives are needed to achieve the same objective. This 
contribution focuses on initiatives that have been undertaken on the international and 
transnational level. By using the doctrines of global space and hybrid structures, this 
contribution aims to get a better understanding of the regulatory initiatives promoting 
the implementation of core labour standards on international and transnational level. 
Since the ILO is widely recognised as the principal rule-setter when it comes to labour 
issues, configurations are sought with the regulatory initiatives of the ILO. Besides the 
initiatives of the ILO this contribution discusses the Guidelines of the OECD, the UN 
Global Compact programme, actions by NGOs, MNEs’ unilateral codes of conduct and 
international framework agreements. 
With regard to regulatory mechanisms the analysis in this contribution shows, within 
all regulatory forms, a tendency away from rule-setting command and control mecha-
nisms towards non-hierarchical, multi-stakeholder initiatives that are characterised by 
ongoing deliberation, dissemination of information and practices in order to prevent 
infringements of the promoted labour standards (problem-solving). In the public ini-
tiatives of the ILO, the OECD and the UNGC, the emphasis lies with those problem-
solving forms of regulation, which are complemented by more traditional forms of 
command and control. Within the ILO this is mainly so for the Conventions that set 
the norms regarding the labour issues, as well as for the 1998 Declaration, which 
translates these norms into principles. Within the OECD a command and control 
mechanism can be found within the dispute resolution function of the NCPs, whereas 
a rule-setting role can be found in the Ruggie Framework, which underpins the Global 
Compact programme of the UN. The tendency towards the problem-solving regulatory 
role is most strongly found within the initiatives of NGOs and the unilateral codes of 
conduct of MNCs. Within these initiatives it is clear that they do not intend to create 
their own standards, but to promote the implementation of the standards formulated 
by public organisations. In general IFAs are reticent about the mechanisms to ensure 
implementation and compliance. Nonetheless, some case studies show that they do 
apply rather complex mechanisms. These mechanisms too show a tendency towards a 
problem-solving role characterised by ongoing dialogue, training and the development 
of preventive measures tackling the core of the infringement rather than Band-Aid fixes 
of incidental infringements.
With regard to hybrid configurations with the ILO CLSs, the analysis in this contribu-
tion makes clear that all regulatory forms, public and private, do in general recognise 
the ILO as the principal rule-setter. The ILO itself, in several programmes, promotes the 
implementation of the CLSs, not only by addressing the member states (by its Conven-
tions and the 1998 Declaration, including their respective compliance mechanisms), 
but also by addressing the MNCs via its Tripartite Declaration. The OECD Guidelines 
are very explicit in referring to the ILO for the interpretation of the labour standards 
dealt with in the Guidelines. In fact, they can be considered to form a transformative 






















B .  T ER  HAAR  LOvE ,  F L I R T  OR  R E P E L
configuration with the ILO, which offers an additional compliance mechanism with 
the system of ‘specific instances’ (dispute resolution by the NCPs) and the proactive 
agenda that helps enterprises to preventively identify and respond to risks. The UN 
Gobal Compact is also very explicit in that the labour principles are based on the ILO 
initiatives. Whereas with the OECD Guidelines it is emphasised that there is an insti-
tutional distinction. This is not the case with UN Global Compact, which not only 
refers to the norm-setting authority of the ILO, but also to the existence of the ILO 
Helpdesk for enterprises, which is part of the ILO MULTI programme that underpins 
the Tripartite Declaration. The UN Global Compact is also very clear about not seek-
ing competition with the ILO; rather it offers an additional platform to promote the 
implementation of the labour standards, based on the logics of appropriateness. 
The picture of the hybrid configurations of the private initiatives with the ILO initia-
tives is less homogeneous. The main reason for this is that each private initiative is 
designed differently and therefore based on different standards. Nonetheless, the se-
lected initiatives in this contribution and findings of empirical research indicate that 
the labour standards formulated in these initiatives increasingly converge towards the 
ILO CLS. NGOs and IFAs increasingly use the ILO initiatives as an authoritative source 
of rule-setting, in particular the 1998 Declaration. The unilateral codes of conduct rely 
more frequently on the principles of the UN Global Compact, which are in turn explic-
itly based on the ILO initiatives. In the sample of twenty codes selected in this paper, 
only four make no reference at all and only one uses its own definitions and inter-
pretations. Only the latter could be seriously considered as a rival to the ILO, whereas 
the others do not seem to intend to, but are at best unconsciously complementary to 
the ILO initiatives. The added value of these complementary configurations in terms 
of regulatory mechanisms lies in particular with the proactive approaches identifying 
potential risks of infringements and developing policies to prevent such infringements 
or repetition of manifested infringements. An important aspect here is the ongoing 
monitoring of compliance via well-developed audit systems, sometimes complemented 
with on-site inspections, and programmes that aim at capability building in general 
and the people involved in the implementation of the standards. 
Besides the transformative configurations with the ILO initiatives, the OECD Guidelines 
and the UNGC form also complementary configurations with the private initiatives. 
Both of them are regularly recognised as one of the sources of the private initiative 
and both promote the implementation of the labour standards on company level via 
unilateral codes of conduct (CSR policies and strategies of MNCs) and IFAs. The latter 
is named explicitly by the UNGC as the preferred means of implementation. 
The ILO itself is less explicit in referring to other regulatory forms. However, in a 
discussion document of 2006,155 the ILO considers that effect to the Tripartite Decla-
ration can also be given by ‘building dialogue with international intergovernmental 
organizations and engaging with other international initiatives related to CSR, includ-
ing but not limited to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
Global Compact’. Also the developments in private initiatives are labelled as interesting 
to study with respect to the role of the ILO in these areas and future ILO activities.156 
From this it can be concluded that the ILO recognises other initiatives as interesting de-
velopments that, besides its own initiatives (complementary), may have a positive con-
tribution to the further promotion and implementation of the core labour standards. 
155 Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises, ‘In Focus on Corporate Social Responsibility’, 2006, 
Second item on the agenda of the 295th Session of the ILO Governing Body. GB.295/MNE/2/1, 
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/lib/resource/subject/csr.htm.
156 Ibid.
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Taking stock of the foregoing, it can be concluded that the hybrid global space of the 
ILO CLSs is characterised by public and private initiatives flirting and occasionally even 
showing forms of love. They are flirting in the sense that they form complementary 
configurations, which is mostly so for the regulatory mechanisms that govern the 
implementation of the core labour standards. They are showing forms of love in the 
sense that the configuration is transformative. As is the case for the OECD Guidelines, 
this only makes a difference in institutional settings and roles, and as such they add 
an implementation mechanism to the ILO regulatory mechanisms. When considered 
this way, instead of considering all initiatives in isolation, the promotion of labour 
standards on the international and transnational level is less fragmented than it appears 
to be. Moreover, both doctrines imply that when both types of regulatory mechanisms 
are applied in complementary or transformative configurations, this would play to 
the strengths of the initiatives and therefore to the effectiveness of those initiatives. 
Whether this is also the case in practice can, however, only be determined by empirical 
case studies. These studies have revealed and underlined that there is no ‘one size fits 
all’ or a ‘silver bullet’ solution for effective implementation of the labour standards. As 
such, a field of initiatives that interact positively is at all times to be preferred over a 
field that is a rival, which in the end can only have a frustrating effect.
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